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INTRODUCTION
In 2015 new amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
took effect.1 The most important of which constrain the right to
discovery in civil proceedings. These changes have roused “passionate”
responses from different stakeholders,2 and they reflect a fiery debate on
plaintiffs’ rights to force defendants to share information. The most
divisive debates revolve around asymmetric information situations. In
these settings, the plaintiff lacks information on the merits of her case,
which resides with the defendant—for instance, typical medical
malpractice cases. On the one hand, discovery imposes extensive
expense on informed defendants, inviting opportunities for abuse and
pushing defendants to settle non-meritorious cases.3 On the other hand,
absent broad discovery uninformed plaintiffs may choose to drop
meritorious claims, leading to “a significant decrease in enforcement and
vindication” of rights.4 Indeed, asymmetric information situations, and
the scope of desired discovery therein, are apparently “[t]he most
important problem in dispute resolution.”5
This Article proposes a new theoretical basis for this debate. The
current discourse presupposes that in asymmetric information situations
formal discovery is essential to force defendants to reveal privately-held
information, which can be “only gained through some court-supervised

1. E.g., Adam N. Steinman, The End of An Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the 2015
Amendments, 66 EMORY L. J. 1, 3 (2016)
2. Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking
Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1112 (2015).
3. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
4. Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157 (2010).
5. Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public
Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 548 (2009).
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discovery.”6 Our point of departure is different. We argue that informed
defendants can “signal” relevant information to uninformed plaintiffs
without formal discovery.
Consider an uninformed victim who files a lawsuit against a doctor
without knowing whether the defendant-doctor is negligent. A nonnegligent doctor is motivated to indicate the strength of her defense to
the plaintiff—since if she can convince the uninformed plaintiff of her
merits, the plaintiff will be induced to drop the suit or agree to a smaller
settlement. In fact, an informed party can employ a variety of litigation
strategies to achieve this goal. For instance, a non-negligent doctor can
send the plaintiff the following message:
You sued me in a state court. I can remove the case to a federal court,
which is, as we both know, a better forum for defendants.
Nonetheless, I forego my right to transfer the case. I am willing to
do so because I know that I was not negligent and I would like to
convince you that if you move forward you will lose the case.7

The defendant’s willingness to voluntarily drop a useful litigation
right is puzzling. Perhaps, but we claim that it is rational. Negligent
defendants would not hasten to “disarm” themselves of the right to
litigate in a pro-defendant, federal forum. In contrast, non-negligent
doctors are more confident about their odds at trial and, hence, are more
willing to offer this type of proposal. Moreover, by doing so, they
indicate their strength to their rivals.
Other common litigation strategies potentially fulfill a signaling
function. Different waivers of procedural rights and defenses can
indicate the strength of the waiving party.8 One-way fee-shifting
stipulations can have a close signaling quality and convey a litigant’s
confidence by voluntarily promising to pay her rival’s expenses in case
of a loss.9 Likewise, defendants sometimes agree to a partial settlement
in which they stipulate to generous damages while the case is being tried
on the question of liability only.10 Such a defendant asserts, in essence,
that she is not liable. In a similar vein, in mediation and arbitration
proceedings parties are occasionally asked to “bet” on their settlement
offers, such that they are penalized in case the judge or arbitrator rules
against them.11 On the face of it, these litigation strategies appear

6. See Wasserman, supra note 4, at 169.
7. See infra notes 232–43 and accompanying text (discussing the actual case that
inspired this example).
8. See infra Part II.B.2.
9. See infra Part II.B.1.
10. See infra Part II.B.3.
11. See infra notes 128–33 and accompanying text.
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incomprehensive—but we claim that they can be understood as
mechanisms to transmit information between the parties without judicial
intervention. Broadly speaking, we refer to these moves as “litigation
signals.”
This Article is the first to offer a comprehensive theory of litigation
signals. To do so, we recognize different types of signals and use these
distinctions to identify workable and non-workable signals. Given the
heated debate over the acceptable scope of discovery,12 and the potential
of litigation signals to convey information without formal, judgesupervised discovery, the scholarly disregard for litigation signals is
unfortunate. A better understanding of litigation signals has important
and timely implications for the desirable design of civil procedure and
court rules. More generally, literature tends to treat settlements
simplistically, without heeding to the possibility of more complex
agreements, e.g., conditional commitments dependent on success.13 In
this sense, this Article further develops a contemporary line in literature
that studies more sophisticated settlements.14
Part I provides background for the Article, explicating the nature of
asymmetric information situations. Part II explains the concept of
“signaling,” which is used more often in other disciplines. As this Part
shows, several litigation strategies can serve as signals; one-way feeshifting, waiving claims and defenses, and generous liability-only
agreements are paradigmatic examples.
Part III analyzes litigation signals more closely, relying on a gametheoretical analysis of settlements. We examine three types of signals:
unilateral, third party, and cooperative. Unilateral litigation signals are
strategies that convey information—but do not require cooperation
between parties, e.g., “I waive my statute of limitations defense to signal
my strength.” While these signals seem intuitive, we show that in fact
they are not likely to occur in practice as they are typically costly to
employ.15 Informed defendants—those who use unilateral signals—are
more likely to settle.16 With that, once “disarmed,” and taken to trial,
they can expect to pay higher compensation. For similar reasons, a
12. See, e.g., supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text and infra notes 173–75 and
accompanying text (discussing the debate over the scope of discovery proceedings).
13. Cf. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2016) (analyzing more complex, partial settlements, and discuss the
differences between partial and the more commonly discussed, full-settlements. Id., at 60–
67).
14. Id. (studying more sophisticated settlements but assume no asymmetric information).
15. For a discussion and a graphic illustration see infra notes 110–12 and accompanying
text.
16. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff who receives a unilateral signal has more leverage in settlement
negotiations as going to trial becomes more attractive to the plaintiff.
Third-party signals involve promises related to parties—other than the
plaintiff and the defendant, e.g., “If you pursue adjudication and I lose,
I promise to donate a certain amount to charity as a signal of my
strength.” We demonstrate that these signals are less costly for informed
defendants and hence more likely to be used than unilateral signals. This
is because they prevent the plaintiff from taking advantage of the
defendant’s signal (the money goes to charity, rather than to the
plaintiff). Nonetheless, in typical cases, informed defendants will refrain
from employing these signals—if the dispute is tried, these signaling
defendants will have to pay more than they should (with the additional
money going to charity). “Cooperative” signals require more intricate
agreements between parties, e.g., “If you take me to trial, I will waive
my jurisdiction defense, but in exchange you will pay me a specified
amount.” These signals solve the problems associated with unilateral and
third-party signals, and in principle, they can always benefit informed
defendants who desire to indicate their strength. However, the
cooperative nature of these signals requires increased transaction costs
and greater sophistication. Against this backdrop, Part III proceeds to
discuss litigation signals in actual settlement negotiations.17 On the one
hand, there seem to be several limitations on the use of litigation
signals—for example, the most effective cooperative signals require
greater transaction costs.18 On the other hand, while direct empirical data
is difficult to collect, real-world evidence supports the use of litigation
signals. While litigants rarely fully tap benefits of litigation signals, they
do employ them to some extent, especially in the basic form of nonmonetary commitments, e.g., waiving important claims and defenses.
Part IV discusses the normative implications of our analysis. First,
the Article offers an alternative outlook on the contemporary discovery
debate. Simply put, we challenge the notion that in asymmetric
information situations formal discovery is essential for conveying
information. Importantly, our litigation signals framework explains how
parties could implicitly transmit information even when they cannot
directly do so. This suggests that the real effect of a narrower right to
discovery may be more limited than commonly conceived. In addition,
the capacity of litigants to signal information and avoid costly discovery
also indicates that the costs of discovery are lower than expected.
17. We devote infra Part III.B. to the discussion of litigation signals in actual settlement
agreements.
18. We summarize the differences between the various signaling techniques below, infra
page 32.
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Second, the discussion on litigation signals pertains to parties’ optimal
freedom to choose their own procedures—with greater leeway to waive
claims and defenses, signaling is easier. While parties can generally
fashion their procedures, several rules undermine the use of litigation
signals. Some states, for example, forbid voluntary one-way feeshifting.19 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to mention another
example, allow litigants to freely add claims and defenses, weakening
the ability of informed parties to signal by credibly waiving claims and
defenses.20 This Article suggests therefore a more nuanced application
of these rules. Third, discussing litigation signals will hopefully urge
courts to create procedures facilitating signaling. A simple mechanism
could enable informed litigants to promise to pay, contingent on losing
the case, an additional amount into court’s coffers—a signaling device
that can be effective in some cases.
We conclude that there is more room to utilize litigation signals,
and we end our Article with a call for lawyers to engage in proactive and
explicit signaling practices in asymmetric information situations.
I. THE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION PROBLEM
Parties to a legal process have strong reasons to settle. As litigation
is costly to both sides, we should expect the parties to seek a contractual
solution—settlement—that saves their joint litigation costs.21 Indeed, the
vast majority of cases settle.22 Cases that fail to settle are aberrations. In
this reality, and given the vast expenses of litigation,23 it is all the more
important to understand the process leading to settlements and the
reasons for settlement breakdowns.
Starting with Bebchuk and Reinganum and Wilde, the literature has
offered a powerful analytical tool for understanding settlement
failures—asymmetric information.24 The idea is straightforward: in
19. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
20. See Infra note 219 (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2)).
21. The logic is similar to that presented by Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
22. In the federal courts, for example, an estimated 2% of civil cases go to trial. Kathryn
E. Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 259, 268 (A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
23. Id. at 262–64. See also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 281 (2004) (“[I]n the United States the administrative costs of the liability system are
large . . . for every dollar received by a victim, a dollar or more is spent delivering the dollar
to him.”).
24. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15
RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984) (showing how some settlements are prevented under a theoretical
model in which defendants have private information and the uninformed plaintiff holds all
bargaining power); Jennifer Reinganum & Louis Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the
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many instances one of the parties holds relevant information, whereas
the rival party is unaware of that information. In these situations the
uninformed party, who lacks information regarding the value of her suit,
is reluctant to agree to settle the case before trial.
Consider the following example. John pursued an unsuccessful
medical procedure that left him severely injured. While John may have
good reasons to believe that his doctor was negligent, it is also possible
that the doctor’s behavior was impeccable, and the medical procedure
failed for unrelated reasons. Importantly, the relevant information lies
with the defendant/doctor, whereas the other party, the plaintiff John,
only knows that with some probability the doctor was negligent.
To demonstrate the effect of this information asymmetry, suppose
that the uninformed John files a lawsuit and that the defendant/doctor
proposes to settle the case for a miniscule sum. John believes that this is
a fair settlement, provided that it comes from a non-negligent defendant.
However, uncertain about the actual behavior of the doctor, John
suspects that the defendant proposes less than she actually should.
Therefore, John may well refuse a low settlement offer and pursue a
trial.25 In some cases, the foregoing dynamic might lead John to
completely drop a meritorious suit—meaning that informed defendants
can sometimes avail themselves of plaintiffs’ ignorance.26
This simple example also demonstrates other relevant features of
the information asymmetry models. First, if the case proceeds to trial,
the private information held by the defendant would typically become
public, e.g., through testimony or pre-trial discovery.27 The defendant
perhaps desires to transmit that information to the plaintiff as early as
possible in order to avoid trial, e.g., by handing over evidence that
indicates the strength of her claims. In many cases the defendant can
indeed convey favorable information directly to the plaintiff. However,
Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557 (1986) (same, under a model in which
plaintiffs have private information and bargaining power). See also Kathryn E. Spier, The
Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 93 (1992) (presenting the same logic,
with a model that includes several rounds of negotiation); Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F.
Reinganum, Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement-Bargaining
Models, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 83 (2014) (surveying the literature).
25. See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining in detail the game-theoretical foundations of this
brief description).
26. This result holds, for example, when John has a good case against negligent
defendants, but he is better off not suing non-negligent defendants (i.e., John’s claim against
the latter is a so-called “negative expected value” suit). See Robert G. Bone, Modeling
Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 542, 550–66 (1997) [hereinafter Bone, Frivolous
Suits] (analyzing these situations).
27. See, e.g., Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 87, 99 (1995).
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in other cases such informational flow is not feasible; for instance,
defendants may lack favorable evidence to hand over. More generally, it
would sometimes be difficult for the informed defendant to cheaply
indicate her private information prior to its revelation at the court.28 In
other words, the outcome at trial could reveal information that the parties
cannot voluntarily disclose, even if they wish to.29 Second, while
litigation can reveal the actual behavior of the doctor during the
operation, it entails considerable expense to both sides. Third, the parties
are typically aware of their strengths and limitations—the doctor knows
that John is uninformed regarding the cause of the failure of the medical
procedure; and John understands that the doctor knows the reasons for
the failure.30 Fourth, John can assess the likelihood that medical
procedures fail due to a doctor’s fault; however, he does not know
whether his surgery did not succeed due to negligent behavior. These
assumptions are embedded in virtually all models of this type.31
Indeed, medical malpractice is an area of law widely considered to
exhibit asymmetric information problems. Typically, the “patient has no
direct knowledge of what the doctor did,”32 while the doctor is wellaware of the merits of the case, “the quality of care actually delivered.”33
In addition to medical malpractice, asymmetric information problems
plague other areas of law. Notable examples include discrimination in

28. Cf., Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20
RAND J. ECON. 183, 193 (explaining why, in certain circumstances, it may not be useful for
informed parties to reveal favorable information before trial—“it may take time for [the
informed party] to assemble evidence; he may know what the evidence will show at trial
without being able to convince the [uninformed party] of this beforehand.”).
29. Id. More generally, private information could stem from various sources, some of
which seem particularly difficult to convey. For instance, the defendant can have private
information regarding her capacity to withstand a long trial. For a short discussion and survey
of the relevant literature see Shay Lavie, Asymmetric Information in Litigation, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Alain Marciano and Giovanni Battista Ramello
eds., 2d ed. 2019 forthcoming).
A related point is the feasibility of independent investigation by the uninformed. For instance,
in some cases the plaintiff could reveal the defendant’s private information prior to filing.
However, in typical asymmetric information cases—as the example in the text suggests—
such independent investigation seems too costly to pursue. Cf., Bone, Frivolous Suits, supra
note 26 (analyzing the capacity of the uninformed to independently acquire information).
30. In formal terms, the assumption is that aside from the private information all relevant
parameters are common knowledge.
31. See, e.g., Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 24, at 85–87.
32. Bone, Frivolous Suits, supra note 26, at 550.
33. Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 491, 495 (1997). See also Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 926 n.219. (2009) [hereinafter Bone,
Pleading Rules] (providing references for the asymmetric information phenomenon in
medical malpractice cases).
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general and employment discrimination in particular. Generally,
“unearthing discrimination is difficult [for the plaintiff] because
evidence of a defendant’s intent or practices is often in its exclusive
possession.”34 For similar reasons, other areas, such as securities fraud,
antitrust, and civil rights litigation are also vulnerable to asymmetric
information problems.35 Along these lines, asymmetric information is
considered to be a major problem in class actions in several areas.36
While the foregoing relates to information that only resides with the
defendant, the plaintiff can also possess private information, for
example, regarding “the level of damages she has suffered.”37
The literature, then, has recognized asymmetric information as a
major problem, perhaps even “[t]he most important problem in dispute
resolution.”38 It is difficult to validate empirically the predictions that
asymmetric information models generate.39 Nevertheless, what we know
34. Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 65, 91 (2010). See also William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility
Pleading, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 714 (2016) (“It is possible that any given one of them was
fired for reasons related to intentional discrimination, but it is also possible that any given one
of them was fired for entirely separate reasons, such as poor individual performance . . .”).
35. See, e.g., Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 33, at 925 & n.217, (explaining why
plaintiffs in these situations lack relevant information); Wasserman, supra note 4, at 168 (“The
two most notable pieces of information that are beyond plaintiff’s reach at the outset are
evidence of defendants’ subjective state of mind and evidence of defendants’ private, behindclosed-doors conduct, [particularly affecting] a range of constitutional rights . . . ” (footnote
omitted)).
36. E.g., Alon Klement, Threats to Sue and Cost Divisibility Under Asymmetric
Information, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 261, 262 (2003) (“class action defendants often hold
private information concerning their liability, whereas no such information is available to the
dispersed, low interested plaintiff class”); Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 IOWA
L. REV. 61, 76 (2016) (discussing securities class actions).
37. Spier, supra note 22, at 272. As before, in case plaintiffs have private
information, defendants can only know the distribution of possible harm among different
plaintiffs.
38. Rhee, supra note 5, at 548.
39. “[T[he empirical work so far has to be considered preliminary.” Keith N. Hylton &
Haizhen Lin, Trial Selection Theory and Evidence, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS—PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 487, 505 (Chris William Sanchirico ed.,
2d ed. 2012). The predictions of asymmetric information models should be compared to other
models, and in particular the influential model presented in George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). In a nutshell,
unlike the asymmetric information notion, Priest & Klein assume that both parties have
divergent expectations with regard to the result at trial—e.g., mutual uncertainty about the
way in which the presiding judge will interpret the law. These two theories entail different
predictions. Mutual, divergent expectations “impl[y] that the selection of cases that go to trial
involves cases wherein the likelihood of either side wining approaches 50%”; in contrast,
asymmetric information models predict that the failure to settle will result in skewed win rates.
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Settlement, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS—PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 386, 439 (Chris William Sanchirico ed.,

10

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:58

to date seems at least partly consistent with the asymmetric information
premise.40
A straightforward remedy for the asymmetric information problem
is formal, court-supervised discovery, which forces the informed
defendant to provide information to the uninformed plaintiff. This
important role of discovery proceedings has garnered considerable
attention among scholars who study the legal process.41 As the heated
debate over the 2015 amendments suggests, in asymmetric information
cases “only formal discovery is able to provide plaintiffs with
information necessary” to proceed. 42 This Article takes a different
approach. Instead of court-supervised formal discovery proceedings to
transmit information, we highlight the power of informed parties to
independently convey their privately-held information to their rivals, in
myriad ways. To do so, we use the concept known as signaling.
II. SIGNALING IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
A. Signaling and Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information is not unique to legal settings. Tools that
were developed in other disciplines can be useful to our understanding
of legal disputes. Notably, economics literature utilizes the concept of
“signaling” to analyze asymmetric information settings.43 Signaling
2d ed. 2012).
40. In line with the predictions of asymmetric information models, in areas in which
defendants typically possess informational advantages their win rate with respect to cases that
made it to trial is higher than 50%. Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Trial Selection Theory
and Evidence, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS—PROCEDURAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 487, 500–01 (Chris William Sanchirico ed., 2d ed. 2012). Note that the divergent
expectations model also gains empirical support. For example, id., at 501–05 (surveying
empirical studies); Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent
Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451 (1998) (attempting at reconciling
conflicting evidence and suggesting that asymmetric information models are more consistent
with cases that terminated before discovery); Daniel Klerman, The Selection of ThirteenthCentury Disputes for Litigation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320 (2012) (presenting
evidence that are consistent with both theories).
41. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 481 (1994) (discussing the effects of discovery); Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Civil
Litigation with Mandatory Discovery and Voluntary Transmission of Private Information, 34
J. LEGAL STUD. 137 (2005) (exploring the role of mandatory discovery versus voluntary
disclosure); Malveaux, supra note 34 (discussing the role of discovery proceedings in civil
rights cases).
42. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 6 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/
reporttothechiefjusticepdf; see also Wasserman, supra note 4.
43. For a discussion of several examples see infra notes 49–50, 53 and accompanying
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refers to the power of informed parties to convey their private
characteristics to uninformed parties, where the latter cannot otherwise
observe these traits.44 For simplicity, we can think that, from the
perspective of the uninformed party, there are “good” and “bad” types
of informed parties, which can diverge, for example, with regard to the
merits of their case, the quality of their product or service, etc.45 In the
absence of concrete information, the uninformed party would treat
“good” and “bad” types of informed parties identically. Hence, the
“good” informed types would have an incentive to signal their quality to
the uninformed party, in order to distinguish themselves from the bad
types, in anticipation of receiving a better treatment. But in order for the
signal to be informative, it has to be a signal that the bad type would not
find worthwhile to mimic. Otherwise, the bad types would send the same
signal as the good types, and the signal would lose its informative value.
In a seminal article published in 1973, economics Nobel laureate
Michael Spence offered the first signaling model.46 Spence posits higher
education as a costly signal—“good” prospective employees pursue
costly education, among other things, to signal their type in the job
market and distinguish themselves from “bad” employees.47 This
strategy can be successful as education is assumed to be more onerous
for the “bad” types.48 Hence, potential candidates in the job market may
pursue higher education even if it does not improve their skills and has
no inherent value (i.e., education is useful solely for its signaling
quality).49 Other economists have employed the concept of signaling in

text.
44. E.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1041
(2006) (“Signaling involves the communication of information that cannot be effectively
communicated through explicit statements of intention or character.”).
45. E.g., Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355, 361 (1973)
(discussing signaling and assuming two “groups” of job applicants, more and less productive).
46. E.g., Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property
Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1935, 1986 (2014) (“The theory of marketplace signals was
principally developed [i]n a seminal paper [by Nobel Prize winning Michael Spence, who]
showed how post-secondary education could be understood as a kind of economic signal, sent
by job seekers to employers.”).
47. Spence, supra note 45, at 358 (“Individuals . . . are assumed to select signals [such
as education] so as to maximize the difference between offered wages and signaling costs.”);
See also supra note 46.
48. Spence, supra note 45, at 358 (discussing the “Critical Assumption” for the signal to
“effectively distinguish one applicant from another,” namely, that “the costs of signaling are
negatively correlated with productive capability.”). See also Michal Barzuza, Noise Adopters
in Corporate Governance, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 627, 644 (2013) (“Spence’s framework
suggests that, with asymmetric information, ‘good’ types may signal that they are good by
undertaking costly actions that are more costly for ‘bad’ types”).
49. See Spence, supra note 45.
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the contexts of advertising and paying dividends, costly practices that
can convey the quality of firms’ products and their financial strength.50
The concept of signaling has also been developed by scholars from other
disciplines. One famous example is the use of signaling in evolutionary
biology, where animals indicate their quality through the adoption of
seemingly costly traits—the “handicap principle.”51 To illustrate, by
sporting a flashy tail the peacock can signal to potential mates
unobservable genetic qualities, “prov[ing] his strength and agility by
carrying a heavy load.”52 Another well-known example is conspicuous
consumption of luxury goods, which signal one’s social status.53 Legal
scholars have similarly employed signaling to analyze various settings.54
B. Litigation Strategies as Signals
A similar logic applies to litigation settings that suffer from
asymmetric information problems. Consider areas such as medical
malpractice or employment discrimination, in which defendants are
typically informed as to the merits of the case whereas plaintiffs are
not.55 For the same reasons that “good” employees are willing to invest
in costly signals, we should expect “good” defendants—those whose
actual liability is likely to be small—to strive to signal their merits to
uninformed plaintiffs. By doing so, “good” or “strong” defendants can
distinguish themselves from “bad,” “weak” ones and achieve a better
settlement. Indeed, “good” defendants can indicate their merits by
simply proposing low settlement offers.56 Low offers are more likely to
be rejected by plaintiffs; hence these defendants assume a greater risk of
a costly trial. However, the costs to “bad” defendants from going to trial
are higher, and may be much higher.57 By merely proposing lower
50. See, respectively, Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of
Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986); B. Douglas Bernheim & Lee S. Redding,
Optimal Money Burning: Theory and Application to Corporate Dividends, 10 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 463, 482 (2001).
51. AMOTZ ZAHAVI & AVISHAG ZAHAVI, THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE: A MISSING PIECE
OF DARWIN'S PUZZLE (1999).
52. Id. at xiv.
53. E.g., Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory
of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 349–50 (1996).
54. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 85 (2002)
(explaining the wave of constitutionalism in developing countries as a signaling device); Eric
A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
765, 766–77 (1998) (hypothesizing that social norms can serve as a signal that distinguishes
between cooperators and non-cooperators).
55. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
56. Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 24. We discuss this benchmark signaling technique
in infra Part III.A.I.
57. See generally id.; Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 24, at 88–89.
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settlements, then, defendants signal that they are more confident of their
merits.
Low settlement offers are, however, a very basic signaling
technique. We argue that mindful parties can employ a wide array of
richer and more complex signaling devices. Moreover, these signaling
techniques can be far more effective than merely offering a low
settlement. We demonstrate this point by discussing three litigation
strategies that have a signaling function: one-way fee-shifting
provisions, waiving defenses, and award-modification agreements.
1. Voluntary One-way Fee-shifting
The American rule holds that each party bears its legal expenses.58
But parties can generally stipulate as to this rule.59 Consider the
following message from an informed defendant to uninformed plaintiff:
Hypothetical I—One-way Fee Shifting. “I offer to pay your legal
expenses should you take me to trial and win. In the event that you
take me to trial and I win, you are exempt from reimbursing me for
my legal expenses. I am willing to do so because I am confident that
I am going to win, and to help convince you of this.”

Voluntary one-way fee-shifting provisions are not uncommon, at
least in pre-dispute agreements.60 A study that examined commercial
contracts found such asymmetric fee-shifting clauses in approximately
17% of the contracts.61 These provisions are puzzling. Why would
litigants voluntarily offer to pay their rival’s expenses in case of a loss,
without insisting on the rival’s obligation to pay their expenses should
they win?62 The literature has extensively analyzed the reasons behind
mandatory one-way fee-shifting rules,63 but it has neglected the
58. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the
American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 327, 327 (2013).
59. Id.
60. In addition to pre- and post-dispute stipulations, parties can modify the existing feeshifting rules in various other ways to achieve a similar result. Rule 68, for instance,
essentially allows parties to reject an offer and pay the rival’s costs if “the judgment that the
offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer.” FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d).
Therefore, a party who rejects a Rule 68 offer essentially agrees to pay its rival’s expenses
contingent on unfavorable outcome at trial.
61. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 58, at 352. But see John J. Donohue III, Opting for
the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1110 n.38 (1991) (during the course of litigation there seem to be
few, if any, fee-shifting stipulations).
62. Cf. Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2043
(1993) (“[N]o companies willingly agree to one-way fee shifting provisions against
themselves.”).
63. E.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
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common, voluntary adoption of these clauses.64 This oversight is
unfortunate.
One-way fee-shifting stipulations typically appear in pre-dispute
contracts, a setting admittedly distinct from the realm of litigation
strategies that this Article discusses. Nonetheless, the idea of one-sided
commitments, contingent on the outcome at trial, illustrates and
implements the concept of signaling. Intuitively, one-way fee-shifting
provisions can serve as a signal, attesting the strength of the defendant’s
claims. Consider a medical malpractice case. If the defendant were a
negligent doctor, the argument goes, she would not be willing to offer to
pay her opponent’s legal expenses should she lose. By contrast, a strong,
non-negligent doctor can more easily assume that risk—because she
knows that she is likely to prevail. Hence, the doctor’s promise to
reimburse the plaintiff in case the latter wins indicates the strength of the
doctor’s claims. Strikingly, in actuality, voluntary one-way fee-shifting
provisions are highly common in situations that typically suffer from
asymmetric information—such as loan agreements—where the
provision works against the informed party.65
2. Waiving Defenses and Claims
A similar logic applies to acts in which one of the parties waives an
advantageous defense or a claim. Consider the following example, based
on an actual case:
Hypothetical II—Dropping Claims and Waiving Defenses. A
renowned law professor is sued for defamation in a French court,
following an unflattering book review published by the journal she
edits. The case has no contacts to France and the professor holds a
strong, preliminary jurisdiction defense. Nonetheless, she asks the
court to waive the jurisdictional defense and move to the merits.

This strategy nicely fits the concept of signaling. A defendant with
a weak case on the merits would hesitate to waive her substantial
preliminary defense. But a defendant whose merits are strong would
forego the preliminary jurisdiction claim with more confidence. Hence,
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653, 670 (1982) (presenting various rationales such as fairness
and the desire to incentivize lawsuits).
64. We found only brief discussions on the adoption of voluntary one-way fee-shifting.
See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 58, at 370–72 (“in [certain] type[s] of cases . . . imposing
the full cost of the harm—including the costs of the other party’s defense in litigation—on the
responsible party makes sense.”); Krent, supra note 62, at 2043, n.25 (“corporations could
agree to such provisions as a type of good faith bond, signaling that they intend to honor
contractual . . . responsibilities . . .”).
65. In these situations, one-way fee-shifting provisions can be found in the majority of
contracts. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 58, at 356–57.
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to the extent that the defendant is privately informed regarding the
merits, her move conveys information about her strength (on the
merits).66
Hypothetical II can be generalized to any case where parties
possessing private information on a particular issue have otherwise
similar claims or defenses. Consider preliminary defenses in areas such
as medical malpractice and employment discrimination, which, as
pointed out, suffer from asymmetric information about the merits.
However, with regard to the preliminary defenses that the defendant
might raise—e.g., statute of limitations—neither party has an
informational advantage. Hence, the preliminary defense, the value of
which is roughly known to both sides, can be used to indicate the value
of each defendant’s merits. There seem to be many opportunities for
signaling along these lines.67
3. Award-modification Agreements
In many actual contracts the parties agree, in advance, to set the
future award of damages at pre-determined levels.68 These partial
settlements can be referred to as award-modification agreements.69
Award-modification agreements can be a vehicle to credibly signal
information. Consider the following description of an actual agreement:
[I]f the defendant were found by the jury to be not at fault, or less
than 50% at fault, the plaintiff would recover $6,000 . . . if the
defendant were found to be over 51% at fault, [the plaintiff] would
recover $22,500.70

66. This example is inspired by an actual case in which Joseph Weiler, a professor at
New York University and the Editor-in-Chief of the European Journal of International Law
was sued in defamation in a French court. The reason was an unflattering book review that
Weiler’s journal published. The reviewer was a German professor, and the author of the book
was an Israeli academic. On its face, the case was unrelated to France and Weiler held a strong,
preliminary jurisdiction defense. Nonetheless, he “specifically asked the Court not to examine
[the] jurisdictional challenge as a preliminary matter,” and proceeded to win the case on the
merits. While we use this example to demonstrate signaling the story is more complicated;
apparently, Weiler requested to move to the merits in order “to challenge this hugely
dangerous attack on academic freedom.” Joseph Weiler, In the Dock, In Paris. EJIL: TALK!
(Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/in-the-dock-in-paris/.
67. Another example, discussed in the Introduction, is dropping the right to litigate in a
federal forum. For several other concrete examples of signaling through waiving procedural
rights see infra note 85.
68. Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 63.
69. Id., at 85–86.
70. Verdict and Settlement Summary, Clemente v. Duran, No. L-003405-04, 2006 WL
4643243 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 18, 2006). This agreement also held that “if the
defendant were found to be 50% at fault, the plaintiff would recover $11,250.” Id. For a
discussion of this case see Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 92.
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At first blush, this is a standard agreement that limits the possible
award of damages (also known as “high-low agreement”71). A closer
look suggests that this arrangement may be less trivial, as it appears to
magnify the liability of defendants who are found to be over 51% at fault,
relative to less-negligent defendants.72 Yet, this agreement is a potential
signaling device. A defendant who is confident regarding her case would
be willing to augment the award at trial; by contrast, a defendant with a
weak case would hesitate to do so.
A similar effect can be achieved through other award-modification
agreements. Take a partial settlement in which the parties stipulate
damages and the case is tried on liability only—a common practice.73 A
defendant who stipulates to generous damages asserts, in essence, that
she is not likely to lose on the merits.
Another example along these lines is taken from lawsuits against
multiple defendants—the so-called Mary Carter agreements.74 As part of
these agreements, one defendant settles by guaranteeing a minimum
recovery to the plaintiff, but any amount the plaintiff later recovers
against the non-settling defendants is credited to the settling defendant.75
In essence, the settling defendant agrees to pay the plaintiff conditional
on the outcome of the other trials.76
Why should the settling defendant concede liability early on, and
risk paying a considerable amount if the plaintiff loses the case against
the others?77 Signaling provides a possible explanation—the settling
defendant indicates that she is less liable relative to the other defendants,

71. Under high-low agreements, “a plaintiff agrees to a cap (the ‘high’) on potential
damages in exchange for a guaranteed minimum (the ‘low’).” Prescott & Spier, supra note
13, at 63.
72. To illustrate, suppose that less-negligent defendants are on average 25% at fault; and
that more-negligent defendants are on average 75% at fault. In that case, given that lessnegligent defendants pay $6,000, we should presumably expect the more-negligent defendants
to pay thrice as much—$18,000. However, the parties stipulated that the more-negligent
defendants will pay $22,500.
73. For a comprehensive discussion of similar award-modification agreements, the
growing use thereof, and actual examples see Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 85–94, 110–
12.
74. The term “Mary Carter” agreements is a reference to a settlement used in Booth v.
Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See also Lisa Bernstein &
Daniel Klerman, An Economic Analysis of Mary Carter Settlement Agreements, 83 GEO. L.J.
2215, 2215 (1995).
75. Id., at 2215–16.
76. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 24 cmt. i (2000)
(“[T]he more that is recovered by the plaintiff from the nonsettling tortfeasors, the less that
the settling tortfeasor is required to pay.”).
77. E.g., G. Michael Bourgeois, There’s Something About Mary, 86 A.B.A. J. 60, 60
(2000) (“[F]or the defendants’ lawyers, entering into a Mary Carter settlement can be risky.”).
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and she backs this assertion through a seemingly unreasonable monetary
commitment.78 Similarly to other award-modification agreements, Mary
Carter agreements are well-known in practice and seem to be
increasingly popular.79
Award-modification agreements can be triggered by various
reasons. The literature has shown that parties can enter high-low
agreements in order to remove the issue of damages from the jury and
save litigation expenses.80 Others argue that Mary Carter agreements
constitute a transaction between an uninformed plaintiff and one
defendant, in which the latter provides the former with necessary
information to incriminate the remaining defendants.81 While we do not
challenge these explanations, we believe that the desire to signal private
information provides another motivation for the use of awardmodification agreements, particularly where the defendant agrees to set
the plaintiff’s award at a generous level.82 The signaling perspective can
thus enrich the academic and practical discourse regarding awardmodification agreements.
* **
This Part has shown that common litigation strategies—fee-shifting
provisions, waiving claims and defenses, and award-modification
agreements—can serve as signaling techniques. This list is by no means
exhaustive. One can imagine other litigation practices that convey

78. Cf., Bernstein & Klerman, supra note 74, at 2227 n.35 (alluding to the signaling
function of Mary Carter agreements).
79. See id. at 2215 & n.2.
80. For a general discussion on the desirability of partial settlements of this type see
Prescott & Spier, supra note 13. Prescott and Spier do not discuss asymmetric information—
they assume that parties have complete information but they diverge on their expectations
regarding their odds of success at trial. Id., at 75–80. Cf., supra note 39 (comparing divergent
expectations to asymmetric information models).
81. See generally Bernstein & Klerman, supra note 74. One wonders whether such a
transaction cannot be consummated through a simpler deal. For a brief discussion see id., at
2225–28.
82. To illustrate with regard to a liability-only agreements consider Verdict and
Settlement Summary, Dottolli v. McDonnell’s Bar & Grill, No. CamL-6900-03, 2007 WL
8026005 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 2007). The defendant, a tavern owner, agreed to
litigate liability and set damages at $140,000, where the plaintiff, a patron of the tavern,
contended that he suffered a severe sprain ankle as a result of walking the stairway. The
stipulated damages seem to be high relative to the injury. However, a non-negligent defendant
could agree to set damages at an excessive level in order to indicate its strength. Indeed, the
jury in this case found that the defendant was not negligent. Importantly, this case appears to
implicate asymmetric information. The main issue at trial was whether the staircase was in
compliance with the relevant regulation—information that typically resides with the
defendant.
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private information. In light of the growing interest in signaling among
legal scholars, on the one hand, and the ongoing debates over
asymmetric information in litigation settings on the other hand, it is
surprising that the literature has scarcely discussed the power of litigants
to signal their merits. The disregard for this issue is particularly
astonishing as it encompasses two major bodies of literature—
sophisticated game-theoretical analysis of settlements and policyoriented legal scholarship.
Several game-theoretical articles have identified distinct litigation
features that signal information—examples include filing for costly
injunctions, investing in observable pretrial preparation, and utilizing
intermediaries such as attorneys and litigation funders.83 As it focuses on
concrete signaling “technologies” this body of literature underestimates
the power of litigants to overcome asymmetric information problems
through signaling.84 Moreover, the game-theoretical literature is
typically oblivious to the legal background and concomitant policy
implications. Several legal scholars mention the ability of litigating
parties to signal information; however, these discussions are often
cursory.85 Furthermore, like the game-theoretical literature, these
83. See Thomas D. Jeitschko & Byung-Cheol Kim, Signaling, Learning, and Screening
Prior to Trial: Informational Implications of Preliminary Injunctions, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
1085 (2012) (conveying information through filing injunctions); Philippe Choné & Laurent
Linnemer, Optimal Litigation Strategies with Observable Case Preparation, 70 GAMES &
ECON. BEHAV. 271 (2010) (same, through investment in observable pretrial preparation);
Shmuel Leshem, Contingent Fees, Signaling and Settlement Authority, 5 REV. L. & ECON .
435 (2009) (the signaling effect of delegating control to attorneys); Ronen Avraham &
Abraham Wickelgren, Third-Party Litigation Funding—A Signaling Model, 63 DEPAUL L.
REV. 233 (2014) (signaling through third party financing). More generally, as explained
above, supra note 56 and accompanying text, low settlement offers also constitute a basic
signal.
84. A recent exception is the following working paper, William H.J. Hubbard, Costly
Signaling, Pleading, and Settlement (U. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ. Res. Paper
No. 805, Feb. 1 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947302. This
paper provides a theoretical account of the ability of informed plaintiffs to signal through
costly mechanisms, where this group include various mechanisms such as elaborate pleadings
and filing fees.
85. See, e.g., Bone, Frivolous Suits, supra note 26, at 573–76 (suggesting that plaintiffs
can commit to pay a bond if their case turns out to be frivolous, deterring at least some
frivolous plaintiffs); Rhee, supra note 5 (proposing that parties would “elect to shift [their]
fees to the loser upon prevailing, so long as the party’s good faith belief in the merit of the
case is bonded by the assumption of a higher standard of proof,” and suggesting that such
“election may serve an important signaling function.” Id., at 518, 551; Hubbard, supra note
34, at 698 (arguing that “plaintiffs with strong claims need a way to credibly signal the
strength of their cases [and] [c]ivil procedure itself provides just such a mechanism:
pleading!”). Cf., Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 20–22 (2010) (arguing that contracting firms can agree on certain pleading
standards in order to signal information); Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to
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discussions only highlight concrete signaling mechanisms without
providing a general theory thereof. As a result, this body of literature
misses the wide breadth of litigation signals and the intricate ways in
which they operate.
Our approach is different. We consolidate the sporadic examples
into a general framework, constructing a systematic typology of
litigation signals. Our comprehensive theoretical account yields a more
precise understanding of this subject—and, as a result, more concrete
legal implications.
III. TAXONOMY AND ANALYSIS OF LITIGATION SIGNALS
This Part takes a closer look into the mechanics of litigation signals,
relying on a game-theoretical analysis.86 After presenting our insights,
this Part discusses the limitations of our approach as well as actual
implementation in real-world situations.87
A. A Model of Litigation Signals
We first discuss a benchmark situation, in which no particular
signal apart from the offer itself is utilized and then proceed to other
classes of signals—unilateral, third-party and cooperative.
1. Benchmark Analysis
The starting point is an asymmetric information setting where
defendants are privately informed. There are many representative
situations;88 for expositional purposes, we will employ a medical
malpractice setting. We will refer to the defendants/doctors as females
and the plaintiffs as males. The following analysis presumes two
possible types of doctors—“careless” and “careful” doctors. While the
court is not immune from mistakes, on average careless doctors can
expect to pay larger sums following a trial than careful doctors. We can
think, for example, that a failed operation results in damages of 150, and
the only question is whether the doctor was negligent or not. The careless
doctor predicts, for instance, that there is a 66.67% probability that the

Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114
HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000) (discussing the signaling value of the right to remain silent in
criminal proceedings).
86. Cf. Bone, Frivolous Suits, supra note 26, at 525–27 (discussing the advantages of
game-theoretical analysis of pre-trial bargaining in legal scholarship).
87. This Article only discusses signaling between the parties to the litigation. We note
that similar signals can be aimed at the judge, but such potential signals are beyond the scope
of the current discussion.
88. See supra notes 32–37 (discussing typical situations).
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court will find that she was negligent and rule against her, so that her
,
expected liability is 100 (= 150 ∗ ). Similarly, the careful doctor
assesses that there is a 40% probability of a judgment against her, hence
her expected liability is 60 (= 150 ∗ 0.4). Following the common
description of asymmetric information, we assume that before trial the
plaintiff cannot distinguish between careful and careless doctors,
although he can assess their distribution in the population. For the sake
of example, we will assume that the plaintiff knows that the odds that he
faces a careful, rather than a careless doctor are 50%.
We assume the following bargaining procedure. First, the plaintiff
brings a lawsuit against the doctor. Then, the doctor can make a single
settlement offer to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff accepts the offer the case
is settled; otherwise, it goes to trial. If there is a trial, each party incurs
his or her litigation expenses. For simplicity, we will assume that
litigation costs amount to 25 for each party, defendants and plaintiffs
alike. The single offer assumption is of course a simplifying description,
as in actuality there may be counteroffers and revisions of the original
settlement, and this process can affect the behavior of litigants. However,
the single offer assumption is a standard tool that essentially
conceptualizes a bargaining process in which one of the parties—in this
example the proposing defendant—has superior bargaining power.89
With no private information, we would expect the careless
physician to make a settlement offer equal to her expected liability at
trial minus the plaintiff’s litigation costs, or, 75 (= 100 − 25) under the
foregoing numerical example. The plaintiff should accept this offer with
certainty, as he would gain nothing from rejecting it—this amount, 75,
exactly reflects the payoff that the plaintiff receives by going to trial
against the careless doctor. As a settlement offer of 75 will be accepted,
there is no reason for the careless defendant to offer more than that sum.
For similar reasons, the careful defendant has no reason to offer more
89. Moreover, below we indicate contexts in which our analysis seems sensitive to the
single-offer assumption. See infra note 114. For a more elaborate, general discussion on the
single-offer assumption see Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 24, at 85, who explain why
despite being “a highly stylized story . . . [t]he vast majority of the papers in the settlement
literature have employed this canonical form of modeling.” While more sophisticated models
have allowed for multiple rounds of negotiation, the main insights of the simple, single-offer
model persist. See id., at 89–90; Bone, Frivolous Suits, supra note 26, at 570–71. As a side
note, it seems plausible to assume that those who have private information in the foregoing
examples, i.e., doctors and employers, also hold superior bargaining capacities. Cf. Hylton &
Lin, supra note 39, at 500 (claiming that models in which the informed party makes the offer
better approximate pre-trial bargaining); Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making
Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1361 (2012) [hereinafter
Bone, Party Rulemaking] (“[M]any features of the employment relationship are imposed on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”).
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than her expected liability minus the plaintiff’s litigation costs, or, 35 (=
60 − 25) in our example. With no informational asymmetries, then, all
cases should settle.
However, due to asymmetric information problems the plaintiff
cannot distinguish, before trial, between careful and careless defendants.
The careless defendants may attempt to bluff, claim that they are careful
defendants and make a low settlement offer of 35. Hence, the plaintiff
cannot trust low settlement offers and must reject at least some of them,
leading to costly trials.
This dynamic eventually leads the careless doctors to reveal their
type, i.e., to make a high settlement offer, 75 in our example. The
plaintiffs always accept these high offers.90 Careful doctors make a low
settlement offer of 35, but the plaintiff is bound to take them to trial
sometimes.91
The intuition for this result is as follows. If the careless doctor
attempts to present herself as careful by offering a low settlement, 35,
she risks going to trial as the plaintiff rejects some low offers. If brought
to trial, she can expect to pay both her legal expenses and, with some
probability, the plaintiff’s damages. In a state of equilibrium the careless
defendant does not find it profitable to bluff. Accordingly, the rate at
which the plaintiff rejects low offers of 35 can be derived
mathematically—the frequency of rejection should be sufficiently high
to guarantee that the careless defendant does not gain from mimicking
the careful one. In the foregoing numerical example, the plaintiff can be
expected to accept ~55% of the low offers he receives.92
Note that for the careful doctor trials are less costly, as her expected
liability is smaller than that of the careless doctor. Hence, although the
plaintiff rejects many low offers the strong defendant still proposes a low
settlement offer. As we found that high offers are definitely accepted and
low offers are accepted ~55% of the time, we can now predict the

90. The uninformed plaintiff cannot achieve a better result at trial—at best, he faces a
careless doctor, and in that case he expects to gain 75 (net of litigation expenses). Hence, the
highest offers, of 75, should be accepted with certainty. Cf., Spier, supra note 22, at 275–76
& n. 26.
91. This is a classic result. For a similar result in a more complicated setting see
Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 24.
92. If the careless doctor reveals her type she expects to pay 75 (her settlement offer
would be accepted with certainty). If she mimics a careful doctor and offers 35, her payoff
depends on the rate at which the plaintiff takes her to trial—if the plaintiff accepts, she pays
35; if the plaintiff rejects, she expects to pay 125 (her expected liability plus her litigation
expenses). Suppose that the plaintiff accepts 𝑦 low offers of 35—in that case, 𝑦 can be
calculated such that the careless doctor is just indifferent between mimicking and revealing
her type: 75 = 35 ∗ 𝑦 + (1 − 𝑦) ∗ 125, hence 𝑦 = 0.55.
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general rate of litigation in this example, ~22%.93 These cases fail to
settle due to asymmetric information problems, i.e., the inability of
plaintiffs to distinguish between strong and weak defendants before
trial.94
We can also predict that the greater the litigation costs, the higher
the settlement rate; intuitively, when trial is more costly parties will have
more incentive to avoid it.95 Likewise, the larger the gap between strong
and weak defendants, the lower the settlement rate. Where that gap is
larger, weak defendants profit more from masking as strong ones and the
asymmetric information problems are aggravated.96 These general
results are standard in the literature.97
This benchmark analysis describes a simple signaling
mechanism—the strong defendant signals her strength by offering a low
settlement, where the risk of rejection and trial is more onerous for the
weak defendants. Beyond the theoretical account, a similar signaling
seems to exist in real-world settings. Although they are not explicit about
the use of signaling, attorneys are often guided to convey that they are
tough negotiators—e.g., to pose “seemingly excessive opening demands
or apparently parsimonious offers” in order to “induce . . . adversaries to
reconsider their own preliminary assessments.”98
The foregoing presents a basic, even primitive signal, which only
uses the amount offered. There is a reason to believe that informed
defendants can use mechanisms other than the offer itself to signal their
strength more effectively. We classify these more sophisticated litigation
signals in three broad groups (i) unilateral signals; (ii) third party signals,
(iii) cooperative signals.

93. As the careless doctor always settles, the careful doctor settles with a 55%
probability, and half of the doctors are careful, the rate of litigation is (1 − 0.55) ∗ 0.5 =
0.22.
94. Cf., Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 24, at 88 (explaining that the uninformed
party has to take some cases to trial in order to prevent mimicry by the informed parties who
have a weaker case).
95. Simply, “increased court costs minimize the threat of going to court.” Andrew F.
Daughety, Settlement, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 95, 134 (Boudewijn &
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)
96. Intuitively, a larger gap “increases the incentive for [informed parties with weaker
case] to claim to be [informed parties with stronger case], thereby requiring more diligence
on the part of [the uninformed, who] accomplishes this by increasing [the rate at which she
refuses to settle].” Id., at 133–34.
97. E.g., Reinganum and Wilde, supra note 24.
98. See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27–28
(2002) (quoting CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT
172 (2d ed. 1993)). See also Gertner & Miller, supra note 27, at 90 (“[A]ttorneys report that
they often resist being the first to propose a settlement out of fear of signaling weakness”).

2018]

LITIGATION SIGNALS

23

2. Unilateral Litigation Signals
Unilateral signals are one-sided commitments that benefit the rival
party if the case proceeds to trial. Litigants with strong cases will be
more willing than litigants with weak cases to make such commitments,
as the former are harmed to a lesser extent by doing so.
We will illustrate this group of signals through unilateral promises
to “double down,” i.e., augment the award at trial conditional on losing.
Consider the following hypothetical message that accompanies a
settlement offer made by an informed defendant to an uninformed
plaintiff:
Hypothetical III—Multiplier Provision. “As a defendant, the private
information that is available to me tells that I am not likely to be
found liable at trial. To help convince you of this, I promise to pay
you twice your judgment should you reject this settlement offer, go
to trial, and win.”

Intuitively, this provision can be an effective signal as it harms
weak defendants to a greater extent than strong ones. The strong
defendants are less likely to lose at trial; hence, compared to weak
defendants, strong ones can more readily promise to augment their
liability in the event of losing. Put differently, this message indicates that
the promisor is confident with regard to its merits. It relies on the fact
that trials convey at least some information—hence a payment
conditional on the judgment can serve as an effective signal. As noted
earlier, the logic that Hypothetical III expresses has garnered scarce
attention from legal scholars.99
Moreover, while Hypothetical III employs a multiplier of two on
the judgment, it in fact generalizes several other litigation strategies.
Previously, we noted that voluntary one-way fee-shifting provisions can
serve as litigation signals.100 Assuming that litigation costs are in the
range of a third of the judgment,101 these provisions resemble a unilateral

99. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. Related to our point are a few papers
that use a mechanism design approach to show that settlements can be encouraged if a postjudgment transfer is conditioned on the outcome at trial. Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining
and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, 25 RAND J. ECON. 197 (1994); Alon Klement & Zvika
Neeman, Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 285
(2005); James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settlements, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 69 (1997). The mechanism design approach employs a more abstract
framework that disregards specific bargaining protocols to study the highest possible
settlement rate under different constraints. While this Article is in line with this literature, our
analysis provides the specific contractual and legal tools that implement the desired results
and demonstrates the contractual and legal tools that are non-workable.
100. See supra Part II.B.1.
101. E.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
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multiplier of ~1.3 on the judgment, to be paid in the event that the
promisor loses. The signaling function fulfilled by waiver of claims or
defenses,102 can also be expressed as an implicit multiplier on the
judgment.103 A multiplier can similarly reflect an award-modification
agreement in which the defendant stipulates, in advance, to inflated
damages.104 Hypothetical III, then, captures a wide range of litigation
tactics that are, in fact, unilateral signals. Common to all these strategies
is a unilateral commitment by the informed defendant that has the
potential to benefit the plaintiff if settlement fails.
The effectiveness of unilateral signals in conveying information is
seemingly straightforward.105 However, this perception is misleading. A
closer analysis reveals that unilateral signals are, in fact, highly unlikely.
The intuition is the following. Consider our previous example, where
careless and careful doctors expect to pay at trial 100 and 60
respectively, and the plaintiff cannot distinguish between the two before
trial. Where the careful doctors offer a multiplier on the judgment the
incentives of the careless doctors to “bluff” are reduced, as they are more
likely to lose and eventually pay the multiplier. Thus, the rate at which
careful doctors are taken to trial is lower. In this regard, a commitment
to augment the award at trial improves the situation of careful doctors.106
But this is only part of the picture. Promising to pay a multiplier in
case of a loss at trial is also counterproductive for careful doctors for two
reasons. First, careful doctors now expect to pay more at trial if their
settlement offer is rejected. Indeed, they expect to pay twice as much if
they offer a multiplier of two and the plaintiff rejects their offer. Second,
and more importantly, once the careful doctor promises to pay a
multiplier, the plaintiff demands a higher settlement offer. We showed
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 285 (1998) (“One-third is the ‘standard’ contingency fee
figure.”).
102. See supra Part II.B.2.
103. To illustrate consider a case in which the expected liability of the defendant on the
merits is 100, and she has a preliminary jurisdiction argument that is likely to be accepted
with a 20% probability. Hence, with the preliminary defense, the defendant’s expected
liability is only 80. By waiving the preliminary defense, the defendant in fact commits to
inflate her liability by a factor of 100/80—akin to a multiplier of 1.25 on the judgment. Of
course, waivers of claims and defenses and multipliers on the judgment are not identical. One
difference is that waivers usually save litigation costs, while multipliers may increase them.
104. For actual examples along these lines see supra notes 70 and 82 and accompanying
text. The multiplier in these examples can be expressed as the ratio between the augmented
award that the defendant promised and her expected liability.
105. Indeed, several legal scholars have alluded to the possibility of signaling through
unilateral promises. See supra note 85.
106. In our benchmark example, careful doctors settled 55% of the time. See supra note
92. One can verify that this rate rises to ~81% with a (unilateral) multiplier of 1.3 on the
judgment.
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previously that if the plaintiff believes that he faces a careful defendant
he will agree to settle for 35—if he rejects this offer, he goes to trial and
expects to gain the same amount.107 However, once the careful doctor
promises to pay a multiplier, the plaintiff becomes more eager to go to
trial and as a result has more leverage during negotiations. To illustrate,
with a multiplier of two, if the plaintiff rejects the offer and goes to trial
he expects to gain 95.108 Therefore, the careful doctor who promises to
pay a multiplier has to raise her settlement to the plaintiff.
In summary, there are three moving forces in the background. A
careful defendant presenting a unilateral signal enjoys a higher
settlement rate; but she has to propose a higher settlement offer, and, if
the offer is rejected she expects to pay more. This analysis holds for all
unilateral signals, including explicit multipliers, award modification
agreements, voluntary one-way fee-shifting provisions, and waiver of
defenses.109 Unilateral signals may seem intuitive, but our closer
inspection reveals that we cannot expect these signals to be triggered
regularly.
When, then, would we expect the parties to employ unilateral
signals? One can demonstrate that due to the foregoing reasons unilateral
signals are typically detrimental to strong defendants and hence are
rarely used by them. Unilateral signals would only be triggered when the
gap between strong and weak defendants is sufficiently wide and the
costs of litigation are sufficiently large.110 Figure 1 uses simulations to
demonstrate:

107. A plaintiff that goes to trial against a careful defendant expects to gain thirty-five:
the careful doctor’s expected liability, sixty, minus the plaintiff’s litigation costs, twenty-five.
108. In that case the plaintiff expects to gain the careful doctor’s expected liability times
a multiplier of 2, 60 ∗ 2, minus his own litigation costs, 25.
109. With a voluntary one-way fee-shifting provision, for example, the informed
defendant gains from the higher settlement rate that accompanies the signal; but she pays more
if she loses at trial—the plaintiff’s litigation expenses; likewise, as a trial is less costly for the
plaintiff, he is now more eager to reject the original offer and the defendant must propose a
higher settlement. Award modification agreements that augment the defendant’s liability
should she lose at trial operate similarly. With a waiver of, say, preliminary defense, the
careful defendant again better indicates her strength, enjoying a higher settlement rate; but she
is more likely to lose, as she waived an important defense; and she made the plaintiff more
likely to win, hence the plaintiff demands a higher settlement.
110. Intuitively, a larger gap between strong and weak defendants intensifies the risk of
weak doctors mimicking as strong ones, making costly signals more valuable. Similarly,
costly litigation stresses the need to find ways to bridge informational gaps.
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Figure 1: Unilateral Signals

The horizontal axis measures the gap between strong and weak
defendants, where J is the ratio between the weak- and the strong-type’s
expected liabilities. (Hence, Figure 1 reflects settings in which the weak
defendant’s expected liability is up to five times the strong defendant’s
liability). The vertical axis measures the costs of litigation, c, relative to
the strong type’s expected liability (litigation costs cannot presumably
exceed the strong defendant’s expected liability). Unilateral signals are
possible only in settings that are presented within the upper right corner
(the gray area)—apparently, a small slice of the universe of cases.111
To further demonstrate how unlikely unilateral signals are, consider
the foregoing numerical illustration, where the expected liabilities of
careful and careless doctors are 60 and 100, and litigation costs are 25.
The numerical example reflects values of 𝐽 = 1.67 (100/60) and 𝑐 =
0.42 (25/60) and it is represented in Figure 1 through a red dot—farther
away from the area in which unilateral signals are possible. More
generally, empirical evidence shows that each side’s litigation costs are
typically lower than half of the expected judgment (i.e., 𝑐 < 0.5),112
111. To appreciate how unlikely unilateral signals are suppose that the distribution of the
ratio of litigation costs relative to the strong type’s liability is triangular on [0, 1] with mode
zero (and a mean of 1/3). Suppose further the distribution of the ratio between weak and
strong defendants is uniformly distributed on the interval 1 to 5 (mean of 3). Then, the
frequency of unilateral signals in the population of asymmetric information cases is less than
3%.
112. As a rough benchmark, contingent fees, which presumably express litigation costs,
typically constitute around 1/3 of the actual judgment, supra note 101. Moreover, the total
expenses that are associated with litigation—of both parties and the court—are estimated to
be, by and large, equal to the judgment, SHAVELL, supra note 23. Hence it is unlikely that
each party’s litigation costs are greater than half of the expected judgment.
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suggesting that unilateral signals are rarely viable.
This section elaborated on the class of signals that are employed
unilaterally and benefit the rival party, using the multiplier provision
example to capture a wide range of litigation strategies. This class of
signals indicates the strength of the informed defendant’s claims, but it
also harms her and improves the plaintiff’s position. Hence, in general,
these signals will be used in narrow enclaves.
3. Third-party Litigation Signals
Litigation signals can be modified to make them less costly for the
informed defendant. This goal could be achieved by a commitment that
does not benefit the plaintiff, but a third-party. Consider the following
hypothetical provision in a settlement offer:
Hypothetical IV—Third Party Multiplier. “My private information
tells me that my case is strong. To help convince you of this, if you
reject this settlement offer, go to trial, and win, I promise to pay, in
addition to the judgment, an equal sum to a charity.”

Hypothetical IV generalizes commitments to spend money on
unrelated causes, contingent on losing the case. Third-party signals, in
our terminology, can therefore manifest themselves in different other
ways, e.g., through a promise by the defendant to “burn” money in case
the plaintiff rejects the settlement offer and the defendant loses.113
Third party signals are more likely to be triggered than unilateral
signals. The intuition is the following. As before, the commitment to pay
in the event of a loss at trial signals the strength of the strong-defendant’s
claim. However, third-party signals also harm the strong defendant, who
now expects to pay more if she loses the case (through a donation to
charity). Take a careful doctor who expects, without any signal, to pay
at trial 60 (in addition to her legal expenses); with a third party signal
similar to Hypothetical IV, this doctor expects to pay as a result of the
trial twice as much, 120, where 60 goes to the plaintiff and 60 to charity.
These two contradictory forces are identical to both unilateral and thirdparty signals.
However, in contrast to unilateral signals, third party signals do not
directly benefit the plaintiff—the additional sum is paid, after all, to
charity and not to the plaintiff’s pocket. Therefore, the defendant need
not inflate her settlement offer. Put differently, the plaintiff’s appetite for
trial remains the same. To illustrate, consider a careful doctor who
113. Cf. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Cheap Talk and Burned Money, 91 J.
ECON. THEORY 1 (2000) (discussing how informed parties can signal information through
self-imposed losses, e.g., burning money).
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commits to a third-party signal along the lines of Hypothetical IV. If she
goes to trial under the third-party provision, this strong defendant
expects her augmented payments after trial to be 120 (= 60 ∗ 2) (plus
her legal expenses). However, a plaintiff who faces this strong defendant
should agree to settle for 35 (= 60 − 25): this is the plaintiff’s gain if
he goes to trial under the third-party signal, an amount identical to the
benchmark, no-signal case. As a result, third-party signals could be
viable in a larger range of circumstances than unilateral signals.114
In summary, self-commitments to third-parties, contingent on
losing the case, remove one hurdle for the strong defendants to signal
their merits. However, this class of signals still embodies a tradeoff—it
enables the strong defendants to better indicate their case and gain more
settlements; but the signal is also costly, as it entails the risk of an
additional payment where settlement negotiations fail and the defendant
loses at trial.
In view of this, when would the parties choose to employ thirdparty signals? While they reduce the rate of trials, third-party signals are
typically too costly to pursue, as they require litigation costs to be
sufficiently large. Figure 2 uses simulations to demonstrate the viability
of third-party signals:

114. The result that the plaintiff does not gain from third-party signals follows from the
assumption that the defendant holds all bargaining power (the single offer assumption). See
supra note 89 and accompanying text. However, even if the plaintiff holds some bargaining
power, he will force the defendant to raise the settlement offer, but this increase would be
lower than the concomitant increase in the unilateral signals case (where the plaintiff directly
profits from the signal). Hence the general proposition in the text remains true—third-party
litigation signals are more likely—even if we relax the bargaining power assumption.
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Figure 2: Third Party and Unilateral Signals

Figure 2 replicates Figure 1 and superimposes on it the region
where third-party signals are operable. As can be easily seen, compared
to unilateral signals, third-party signals are more likely to occur. Yet, our
running numerical example, represented by the red point, is outside the
operable area implying that third-party signals will not occur. As we
noted before, evidence suggests that litigation costs are typically smaller
than half of the defendant’s liability115—hence in real world situations
third party signals seem unlikely as well.116
In sum, third-party signals can be more effective than unilateral
signals. However, third-party signals are also unlikely. While unilateral
and third-party signals require no cooperation,117 the next section
demonstrates that a more sophisticated signaling technique, which
requires cooperation, is more effective.
4. Cooperative Litigation Signals
In cooperative signals the strong informed party likewise commits
to augment her liability should she lose at trial. Unlike unilateral and
115. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
116. To see how unlikely third-party signals are, we ran simulations in which the
distribution of the ratio of litigation costs relative to the strong type’s liability is triangular on
[0, 1] with mode zero and a mean of 1/3 (the distribution of the ratio between weak and strong
defendants is irrelevant). Then, the frequency of third-party signals in the population of
asymmetric information cases is 25%.
117. In this sense, third-party signaling is also unilateral. We chose this terminology in
order to stress the distinctions between self-commitments that benefit the rival party
(“unilateral signaling”) and self-commitments that do not benefit the rival party (“third-party
signaling”).
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third-party signals, the defendant is willing to do so only in exchange for
compensation, reflecting the higher risk she bears. Consider the
following message from an informed strong defendant to an uninformed
plaintiff:
Hypothetical V—Multiplier with Upfront Payment.—“Here is my
low settlement offer. You can either (1). Accept it. (2). Reject it and
go to trial. (3). Reject the offer and go to trial where, if I lose, I
promise to pay you twice your judgment. If you choose option (3) I
demand in return an upfront, specified amount.”

The elegant and powerful feature of cooperative litigation signals
is that they are costly to careless doctors who disguise themselves as
careful ones, but are costless to careful defendants. A payment from the
plaintiff to the informed defendant is essential to achieve this goal—
intuitively, in Hypothetical V this payment should fully reimburse
careful doctors for the risk of losing at trial and paying twice the
judgment.
To illustrate, consider the foregoing numerical example, where the
careless and careful doctors’ expected liabilities at trial are 100 and 60.
Along the lines of Hypothetical V, the careful doctor now offers a
multiplier of two on the judgment, conditional on losing the case, but in
exchange she demands a payment. This fixed payment should equal the
careful doctor’s extra expected liability—60. With this cooperative
signal provision, the careful doctor expects to pay 120 (= 60 ∗ 2) after
trial; but she gains 60 as an upfront payment. Hence, overall she expects
to pay 60 to the plaintiff, as if she had not committed to a multiplier. The
plaintiff, at the same time, is indifferent between going to trial (and
expecting a reward of 60) and paying 60 in order to double his expected
award. Now consider a careless doctor who presents herself as a careful
one, offering the same cooperative signal provision. This bluffing
defendant can expect to pay 200 (= 100 ∗ 2) at trial; but her gain from
the upfront payment is only 60 (because she presents herself as a careful
doctor). Hence, a masking defendant who mimics this cooperative signal
expects to be penalized at trial and pay, in addition to her litigation
expense, 140 (= 200 − 60). Importantly, this sum exceeds the bluffing
defendant’s actual liability, 100. In summary, while strong defendants
who offer truthful settlements are not punished by the cooperative signal
provision, weak defendants who mask as strong ones and offer the same
provision are expected to suffer greater losses. Unlike unilateral and
third-party signals, then, strong defendants cannot suffer from
employing cooperative signals. Hence, in principle cooperative signals
are always feasible.
Figure 3 uses simulations to illustrate how cooperative signals can
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reduce the rate of litigation, using the previous numerical example. The
horizontal axis is the multiplier promised by the defendant, from 1, the
benchmark situation, to 5. The vertical axis measures probability (0 to
1). The graph reflects the rate at which low offers are accepted as a
function of the multiplier. The red point represents Hypothetical V,
which uses a multiplier of two. As the graph demonstrates the acceptance
rate increases from ~56% in the benchmark case, with no multiplier, to
~69% with a multiplier of two:
Figure 3: The Effectiveness of Cooperative Signals

Importantly, Figure 3 shows that even relatively modest multipliers
can generate a considerable increase in the rate of settlements.
Finally, we note that the class of cooperative signals can take many
forms. Hypothetical V demonstrates a fixed payment made before trial,
but this payment can also take place after trial. In a similar vein, the
exchange payment can be a fixed sum or conditioned on losing the
case.118 In the latter case, a cooperative signal resembles a loser-pays
rule, with different post-trial obligations.119 Moreover, cooperative
118. Cf. Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 96 & n.141 (high-low agreements involve a
side payment, the “low,” which is typically paid as a contingent payment after trial, but can
in theory be paid as a separate, fixed payment prior to trial though “in practice this does not
happen”).
119. To illustrate such a cooperative signal: “Should she lose the case, the defendant
agrees to pay x in addition to the judgment against her; in return, the plaintiff agrees to pay to
the defendant an amount z in case he loses.” Of course, x and z should be calculated such that
this commitment is costless for strong defendants while it is costly for weak defendants.
Note that under certain circumstances a simple loser-pays rule will constitute a cooperative
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signals need not use explicit multipliers on the judgment and can be
executed through other signaling technologies, such as waiving claims,
one-way fee-shifting, and award-modification agreements.120 More
generally, we have thus far described settlement negotiations between a
defendant and a plaintiff, but one can think of a third party who
facilitates the transaction through a cooperative signal.121
The following table summarizes our analysis:
Unilateral
Signals*
Yes
Yes
Not required

Third-Party
Cooperative
Signals**
Signals***
No
No
Rival’s gain
Yes
No
Self-harming
Not required
Required
Cooperation
Unlikely (only
Can always be
where litigation
triggered, to the
Highly unlikely
Prediction
expenses are very
extent parties
high)
cooperate
*—Multipliers on the judgment, award-modification agreements, one-way feeshifting, waiving defenses.
**—Donating to charity conditional on the judgment, burning money upon
losing.
***—The unilateral signals examples coupled with a payment from the
uninformed to the informed.

B. Litigation Signals in the Wild
Game theoretical analysis attempts to roughly approximate realworld situations. We do not purport to claim that our analysis precisely
reflects actual settlement behavior. Like other models, it provides a
stylized description of real-world settings.122 Presumably, litigants are
not perfectly rational decision-makers, and real-life situations are more
litigation signal. Assuming that each side’s litigation costs are similar, where the strong
defendant’s expects to win with a 50% probability, the strong defendant’s incurs no additional
expenses from a loser-pays rule while the weak defendant, who presumably win with a
probability lower than 50%, finds mutual fee-shifting unprofitable.
120. To illustrate, a waiver of defense can be integrated into a cooperative signal provision
through the following message from a strong defendant: “I am offering you a low settlement
offer. To convince you that I am a strong defendant, if you reject my offer I am willing to
waive my preliminary defense in exchange for a fixed payment.”
121. Theoretically, a third-party could replace the plaintiff along the lines of Hypothetical
V—a strong defendant could commit to pay an extra-amount to a third-party should the
plaintiff win; and in exchange the third-party could pay the strong defendant a fixed amount,
such that the signal becomes costless for strong defendants but costly for weak ones. Cf.
Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002) (suggesting a
contract in which the promisor pays damages to a third-party in exchange for a fixed payment).
122. E.g., Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 24, at 85 (explaining why standard
litigation models depict “a highly stylized story”).
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complicated than a given theoretical setting, however complex it is.123 It
is plausible to believe, though, that game-theoretical analysis expresses,
at least roughly, a wide range of actual settlement negotiations.124 Many
legal disputes, including those that suffer from asymmetric information
problems, are conducted and managed by seemingly rational parties,
such as attorneys and insurance firms.125 Particularly, the foregoing
describes a medical malpractice case, but asymmetric information is
prevalent in other areas, such as class actions, which often feature
sophisticated, strategic-minded parties on both sides.126 Likewise, while
we discussed a concrete bargaining setting, our analysis ultimately rests
on plausible assumptions. We relaxed some of the underlying
assumptions and we found that our general predictions are similar.127

123. Cf., Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) (discussing
psychological barriers to settlements, against the backdrop of rational decision-making
models).
124. Indeed, empirical evidence corroborates at least some of the predictions of
mathematical models of litigation. See supra note 40. See also Hubbard, supra note 34, at
716–17 (discussing the implications of his game-theoretical analysis and acknowledging that
litigants “do not always make coolheaded calculations about litigation costs and benefits,” but
concluding that, for various reasons, motivations such as “[s]pite, [i]ndignation, and
[o]ptimism” “ought not be overstated.” Id. at 716).
125. See Hubbard, supra note 34, at 716 (“it is usually more realistic to treat the
decisionmaker as the plaintiffs’ attorney, who has the expertise, incentive, and emotional
detachment to make decisions driven fundamentally by the calculus presented above”).
126. For asymmetric information and class actions see supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
127. Mostly, these extensions were conducted in a companion, technical paper titled
Judgment Contingent Settlements, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3000218. First, a more complicated analysis, with an infinite number of different potential
defendants with varying degrees of liability provides similar insights. Second, to the extent
the parties’ resources are limited, they cannot credibly commit to a generous multiplier, but
they still enjoy the benefit of signaling—as even promises to relatively modest multipliers on
the judgment generate a considerable reduction in the rate of trials. Third, we assumed in our
model that the plaintiff is better off bringing the lawsuit against all defendants. Similar
predictions hold in situations in which the uninformed plaintiff has a good case against the
weak defendant; but the suit has a negative expected value against the strong defendant.
Fourth, we assumed throughout that each side carries its legal expenses; the results are similar
under the British rule, in which the loser has to pay the winner’s expenses. Fifth, we accounted
for the rising costs of litigation that are associated with inflating the stakes of the case through
a multiplier. Our predictions are similar, under the additional assumption that litigation costs
are relatively lower the greater the stakes, i.e., that investment in litigation has a decreasing
marginal utility. This assumption is consistent with empirical studies. See, e.g., EMERY G.
LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES:
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS—REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 5, 7 (2010). Sixth, we can apply a similar analysis to cases in
which the plaintiff is informed and the defendant is not. Seventh, the same results hold when
the informed party uses a fixed commitment, rather than a multiplier on the judgment;
likewise, in cooperative signals the fixed payment can be paid before or after trial, and it can
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Against this backdrop, to what extent do parties actually use
litigation signals? We do not claim that parties find the way to signal
their merits in all asymmetric information cases. By contrast, we believe
that litigation signals, especially in the form of monetary commitments
conditioned on losing the case, are under-used, and we conclude our
Article with a call for lawyers to employ them more frequently.
However, we do regularly observe other, more primitive forms of
signaling.
1. Explicit Monetary Obligations
Monetary commitments to pay an additional sum contingent on
losing the case are not common in actual civil litigation. However,
concepts that share the same spirit exist, especially in mediation and
arbitration, where parties are sometimes asked to “bet” on their
valuations. As part of the mediation technique that is known as “bottomline wager,” the mediator asks the parties to place a “bet” on their
settlement offers. This bet implies that if the mediation fails and a trial
materializes, the loser must pay that wager to the rival party.128 In
arbitration, the common procedure known as “baseball arbitration”
requires the parties to submit final offers to the arbitrator, where the latter
must select one of the offers with no discretion to choose an intermediate
value.129 This process penalizes unrealistic offers—which increase the
risk that the arbitrator would pick the rival’s offer.130 One variation to
be supplanted by a contingent payment. For a brief discussion see supra notes 118–20 and
accompanying text. Eighth, we stress that we do not require courts to be perfect decisionmakers. Judges in our model can make errors. It suffices that courts, on average, are able to
distinguish between strong and weak parties. Ninth, litigation signals can be risky, as they
enhance the repercussions of a trial. Therefore, risk-aversion tempers the tendency to use
litigation signals. Nonetheless, we predict that many litigants are approximately risk-neutral,
or, at the least, can hedge the added risk of litigation signals relatively cheaply, e.g., through
third-parties (cf. supra note 121 and accompanying text). Tenth, we assumed that the informed
party proposes a single offer, meaning that she exploits the entire surplus from any settlement.
Single offer is a standard tool in the relevant literature, with independent justifications. See
supra note 89 and accompanying text. The logic in the text pertains to any situation in which
the informed party stands to gain something from revealing information—i.e., any setting in
which the uninformed party does not have all bargaining power.
128. Michael D. Young, Make A Bottom-Line Wager to Break A Negotiation Impasse, 20
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 63, 86–87 (2002) (describing a conditional sum of
$20,000). For additional examples see also JEFFREY KRIVIS, IMPROVISATIONAL
NEGOTIATION 290–95 (2006). We thank Dan Klerman for suggesting this point.
129. E.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80
VA. L. REV. 323, 352 n. 79 (1994) (“In final offer arbitration, each party submits a settlement
figure to the arbitrator, who must choose one or the other [and] cannot ‘split the baby’ . . . .”).
130. E.g., id. (“Knowing that the arbitrator will choose either its figure or the opponent’s,
each party is . . . motivated to propose a more reasonable figure [and] the probability of
settlement increases”).
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baseball arbitration, which comes closer to our hypotheticals, includes
an explicit stipulation of a penalty, to be paid by the losing party in
addition to the amount awarded by the arbitrator.131
The strategy of “betting” on one’s claim, then, is not unknown, at
least in mediation and arbitration proceedings.132 Indeed, these practices
are considered an effective “impasse breaker.”133 These examples
notwithstanding, in ordinary litigation we generally do not observe
commitments to augment the judgment conditional on losing. Even in
arbitration and mediation these procedures do not seem to be widely
used.134 We thus identify several limitations on the actual use of
litigation signals.
First, transaction costs may hinder signaling. While unilateral and
third-party signals are relatively easy to execute, we have shown that
they are not beneficial to strong informed litigants in typical cases, and
will not ordinarily be triggered. However, cooperative signals—which
in principle are always effective—are more difficult to undertake, as they
require the parties to agree on bilateral commitments.135 These
transaction costs notwithstanding, we should still expect at least some
cooperative signaling.136
Second, the overarching legal environment does not seem to
encourage litigation signals. The next Part demonstrates how specific
doctrines inhibit signaling, suggesting modifications that can create an
environment more conducive to litigation signals.
131. See Christian Borris, Final Offer Arbitration from a Civil Law Perspective: How to
Play Baseball in Soccer Country, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 307, 309 (2007) (“In some clauses, the
penalty can be as high as 50% of the difference between the parties’ final positions.”).
132. In addition to arbitration and mediation, we found divorce agreements that resemble
the signaling that this Article discusses—divorcing parties sometimes divide their joint
property through a settlement agreement in which they commit that, should one party hide an
asset and that asset is later discovered, the court would transfer the entire value of the
undisclosed asset to the other party as a penalty. E.g., In re Marriage of Rossi, 90 Cal. App.
4th 34 (2001).
133. Michael D. Young, Bottom-Line Negotiating, 49 FED. LAW. 20, 22 (2002)
(discussing bottom-line negotiation). See also Michael Carrell & Richard Bales, Considering
Final Offer Arbitration to Resolve Public Sector Impasses in Times of Concession Bargaining,
28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 20–21 (2013) (presenting empirical evidence that shows
that baseball arbitration encourages settlements). Baseball arbitration with a stipulated penalty
is considered a particularly effective tool. Borris, supra note 131, at 309.
134. We base this impression on interviews with practicing attorneys and our research of
arbitration and mediation techniques.
135. Cf. Donohue, supra note 61, at 1109–10 (distinguishing between procedural
stipulations that improve both sides’ positions and stipulations that are overall beneficial but
require side-payments, and explaining why the latter requires “added negotiation costs that
. . . will prevent some of [them].”).
136. Cf. Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 89, at 1341 (despite negotiating difficulties
“side payments are . . . possible during litigation.”).
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Third, lawyers may pose the most severe obstacle for the use of
litigation signals in general and monetary commitments in particular.
Naturally, lawyers have an interest in prolonged litigation;137 this is
particularly true for defense lawyers, who are paid on an hourly basis
rather than contingency fees. Lawyers, then, may hesitate to take
proactive and more sophisticated steps—such as committing to an
augmented award—to induce settlements.138 Litigation signals are also
risky, and they seem to require extra-effort from lawyers to explain to
their clients.139 Relatedly, lawyers seem to fear that the use of signaling
would expose them to malpractice claims.140 To illustrate, while a waiver
of defense can signal information,141 failure to pursue a defense is a
common legal malpractice allegation.142 More generally, litigation
signals magnify the risk of an adverse judgment, but lawyers are
commonly advised not to take risky steps in order to avoid prospective
liability.143 Monetary commitments are particularly difficult for lawyers
to undertake on behalf of their clients, due to restrictive ethics norms.144
More generally, there seems to be little innovation in the legal market.145
In this sense our Article can be read as a call for lawyers to engage in
more aggressive signaling in asymmetric information settings, to the
benefit of their clients. We briefly discuss these issues at the end of this
Article.
2. Other Commitments
Monetary commitments conditioned on losing the case are not
common.146 However, it is hard to believe that litigants do not attempt to
indicate their strength to their rival, even if they do so in rudimentary
ways. Indeed, at least intuitively and implicitly, lawyers use low

137. E.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94
MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (2011) (pointing to the incentives of lawyers to leave certain issues
vague in order to encourage disputes.).
138. Cf. Young, supra note 133, at 20–21 (describing how lawyers, in contrast to their
clients, hesitate to bet on their settlement offers in mediation proceedings).
139. Indeed, bottom-line mediation seems not to fit settings in which the “negotiating
representative has no authority to increase the risk to his or her principal [such as] an insurance
adjuster or governmental representative.” Id. at 22.
140. This was a recurrent issue in our discussions with practicing attorneys.
141. See supra Part II.B.2.
142. E.g., Ronald E. Mallen, 4 Legal Malpractice § 33:47 (2017 ed.) (available at
Westlaw) (discussing cases).
143. Cf. id. at § 30:57 (discussing a case in which the court “criticized defense counsel for
using a risky defense that increased the prospects of an excess judgment.”).
144. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 259–65 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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settlement offers as a basic signaling device that communicates their
willingness to face a trial.147 One should expect lawyers to employ more
sophisticated techniques to realize the benefits of signaling.148
Importantly, parties do not have to use explicit, monetary
multipliers to signal their merits. Signals can be expressed through
various other forms, such as voluntary one-way fee-shifting stipulations,
procedural concessions, and award-modification agreements. Parties
regularly stipulate over default procedures,149 and award-modification
agreements are frequent.150
The side-payments that are essential to cooperative signaling do not
have to be monetary either. Rather, they can be nonfinancial in kind,
embedded in the process of pre-trial negotiation over procedural
concessions. Where the defendant has private information with regard to
its liability, for example, the plaintiff can agree to dismiss a claim whose
value is easy to measure in exchange for stipulating to generous
damages.151 This agreement is essentially similar to our cooperative
signal example (Hypothetical V), in which the defendant committed to
augment its liability in exchange for a fixed payment. Interestingly,
Professors J.J. Prescott and Kathryn Spier, who explore high-low
agreements, identify a similar practice in that context.152 They predict
that a side-payment should typically accompany high-low agreements—
but do not find evidence for such payments.153 While there may be

147. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
148. Cf. the practical advice to “embrace” unfavorable documents, which resembles
signaling in spirit—“It tells jurors . . . that you want them to see even harmful evidence, an
unmistakable sign your case is strong.” See David Berg, The Trial Lawyer, LITIGATION,
Spring 2000, at 6, 10.
149. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 58, at 354 (documenting the willingness of
commercial parties in pre-dispute agreements to opt out of the default procedures concerning
jury trials and attorney’s fees); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 389, 419–20 (summarizing findings regarding pre-dispute procedural
agreements). Nonetheless, it seems that parties do not fully employ the opportunities to
customize procedures, especially after the dispute began. See infra notes 266–73 and
accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 73 and 79 and accompanying text.
151. Cf. Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 97 n.145 (demonstrating procedural
concessions in lieu of monetary side-payments through an actual case, in which the parties
agreed to forgo expert medical evidence and the plaintiff dismissed her claim for punitive
damages; Verdict and Settlement Summary, E.P. v. Gannett, No. 09-cv-02091, 2010 WL
4016047 (N.D. Ohio July 21, 2010)).
152. Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, analyze the justifications for high-low agreements
under settings that do not involve asymmetric information. Recall that these agreements can
also be explained by the desire to signal private information. See supra notes 71–73, 82 and
accompanying text.
153. Prescott & Spier, supra note 13 (arguing that “the flexibility (and therefore the
potential attractiveness) of [award-modification agreements] is enhanced by the possibility of
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various reasons for the absence of monetary side-payments, including
restrictive ethics rules that require explicit client consent,154 Prescott &
Spier suggest that non-monetary procedural concessions, which are
well-known in practice, supersede monetary side-payments.155
Taken in this light, the litigation signals approach can explain
various practices. While direct empirical data is hard to collect and future
research may shed more light on this issue, existing data seems to cohere
with the litigation signals perspective.
First, the desire to signal explains various practices—such as the
use of one-way fee-shifting provisions, waivers of claims and defenses,
and generous award-modification agreements—that are at least
somewhat puzzling.156 Other, more mundane practices—for instance, the
willingness of informed parties to speed up litigation, rather than delay
the process—can also be explained through the signaling framework.157
Second, the litigation signals perspective can explain why we often
see early settlements. As we discuss below, most litigants find the way
to settle before discovery, suggesting that there are important channels
to convey information regardless of discovery.158 To further illustrate
this point consider a recent study that finds that the mere filing of a nondiscovery motion encourages settlements.159 This finding is somewhat
surprising, as these motions seem to have no direct informational value.

an accompanying side payment” and providing a graphical and numerical illustration for this
proposition, id., at 96; and asserting that nonetheless “contracts with monetary side payments
are rare.” Id., at 97).
154. See Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 130 n.294 (referring to MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(1) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983), and stating that “one of the reasons
financial side payments are relatively rare . . . is that they require client consent, and thus are
more costly for lawyers to negotiate . . . By contrast, [procedural concessions] (e.g., waiving
a defense) are within a lawyer’s strategic discretion, making them, all else equal, easier to
deploy.”).
155. Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 97 (“[P]artial settlements in which an early
monetary transfer between the parties would make sense are, in our research, uniformly
accompanied instead by a nonfinancial sidepayment [such as] a compensating in-kind partialsettlement term.”); see also Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 89, at 1341–42 (“[Instead of
monetary side-payments] parties could trade [procedural] benefits . . .”).
156. See, e.g., supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text (discussing one-way fee-shifting
provisions and the absence of direct explanation for their use); supra note 82 (an illustrative
liability-only, generous-damages agreement).
157. Our interviewees suggest that delaying trial is a typical strategy, which is sometimes
foregone in order to indicate confidence in one’s case. Of course, the desire to forego the
opportunity to delay trial can stem from various other reasons rather than signaling.
158. See infra notes 180–86 and accompanying text.
159. Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement, 29 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 898 (2012). Boyd and Hoffman’s sample comprises corporate veil-piercing cases,
which may well involve asymmetric information.
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The litigation signals perspective can provide an explanation.160 Waivers
are a signaling device, and they can be consummated implicitly, i.e.,
refraining from raising a certain defense.161 In that sense, every filed
motion can be utilized to convey valuable information—through the
arguments the parties choose not to raise, in addition to the arguments
they explicitly make. More generally, there seems to be a discrepancy
between the fact that the vast majority of cases—“on the order of 95
percent”—are settled and the general predictions of the theoretical
models, which suggest that settlements should be less frequent.162 The
use of litigation signals can help bridge this gap between the evidence
and the theoretical models.163
The foregoing phenomena have, of course, alternative explanations.
Litigants may have independent reasons to adopt one-way fee-shifting,
waive important procedural rights, agree to generously modify the award
at trial, etc. Non-discovery motions can have direct informational value
that facilitates settlements, and parties may be able to disclose
information voluntarily, before trial, bridging informational gaps in
various ways. However, taken overall it is plausible to think that the
litigation signals theory that this Article presents can explain at least
some of these practices. In sum, litigation signals in the form of
monetary commitments and financial side-payments do not seem to exist
in real-world litigation. However, theory and evidence suggest that
litigation signals are more commonly effectuated through other outlets,
in particular, procedural modifications.
IV. LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The capacity of litigants to signal the strength of their cases,
through multiple channels, has various implications. This Part focuses
on three issues: substituting for formal discovery; the freedom of parties
to fashion procedures; and the creation of court-sponsored mechanisms
to facilitate signaling.

160. Cf. id. at 904–05 (proposing theoretical explanations without discussing signaling).
161. We elaborate on the signaling power of implicit waivers below, infra notes 217–29
and accompanying text.
162. See Farmer & Pecorino, supra note 41, at 157.
163. According to Farmer and Pecorino, the theoretical explanation for this discrepancy
is the capacity of litigants to voluntarily disclose pieces of information. Id. While this
explanation seems plausible in many cases, in many other situations parties cannot credibly
convey information, see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text, and they have to signal it
through other means.
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A. Substituting (Partially) for Formal Discovery
If litigants can signal information and bridge informational gaps the
whole debate on discovery is highly affected. The right to discovery has
been curtailed through the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and this move has triggered fierce reactions.164 Narrow
discovery, the argument goes, magnifies asymmetric information
problems and inhibits access to justice.165 Broad discovery, by contrast,
entails enormous costs.166 However, to the extent litigants convey
information through signaling, signaling is a potential substitute for
discovery.167 Our account suggests, then, a more nuanced approach to
the debate over discovery. On the one hand, the detrimental effects of
the anti-discovery trend may be more modest than those the proponents
of broad discovery predict; on the other hand, the costs of broad
discovery seem smaller than those suggested by its opponents.
In 2015, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to
constrain the right to discovery in various ways. Consider, for example,
the following two limitations. First, the new rules emphasize that
discovery proceedings should be “proportional to the needs of the case”
in light of relevant factors.168 The stated goal is to “reinforce[] the . . .
obligation of the parties to consider [the proportionality] factors.”169
Conceivably, this change will place a greater burden on the requesting
party “to show that its discovery request was proportional.”170 Second,
the amended rules now “include an express recognition” for district
courts to “allocate expenses for . . . discovery.”171 This change threatens
to shift the expenses of discovery to the requesting party, typically, the
uninformed plaintiff.172
The debate over discovery and the 2015 Amendments have inspired

164. Supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
165. E.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text.
166. As noted by the Supreme Court, in cases in which discovery is employed it “accounts
for as much as 90% of litigation costs.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)
(referring to an empirical study on discovery).
167. Litigation signals, of course, are not identical to discovery, as they do not actually
reveal information; but they do indicate information, and thus facilitate settlements. Infra
notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
168. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
170. Moore, supra note 2, at 1116.
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
172. See Moore, supra note 2, at 1116. In addition to these two limitations on discovery
the 2015 Amendments include other restrictive changes. See generally id., at 1106–29. But
see Steinman, supra note 1, at, 8 (concluding that “the 2015 amendments do not mandate
more restrictive approaches” and that the “key battleground . . . will be in the federal courts,
as judges are called upon to interpret . . . the rules in particular cases.”).
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strong views from both sides, for and against the right to broad
discovery.173 On the face of it, as discovery is deemed essential to
bridging informational gaps the amendments aggravate the problems
associated with asymmetric information. Indeed, numerous
stakeholders—including numerous scholars—have lamented the “antiplaintiff” approach reflected by these amendments.174 On the other hand,
clearly it is exactly in asymmetric information situations that the
informed party is charged with the costly burden of responding to
discovery,175 and these added costs pressure defendants to settle
unmeritorious cases.
While we do not seek to argue for or against a broader right to
discovery, we offer a fresh perspective to enrich this debate. Our
discussion challenges the notion that “the road to achieving a level of
information parity must be paved with mandatory disclosure rules.”176
We suggest that informed parties, who stand to incur litigation expenses,
have independent, strong incentives to convey their private information
to the uninformed litigant. Moreover, we showed earlier that informed
parties have at their disposal various techniques to indirectly convey
information—even when these parties lack the ability to communicate
that information directly.177
Our theoretical account influences the debate over discovery in two
ways. First, we suspect that the gloomy predictions regarding the antidiscovery changes should be qualified; the capacity of privatelyinformed litigants to convey information in order to save future trial
costs can mitigate these effects. We stress that this argument is most
forceful when one believes that trial has the capacity to reveal the truth,
i.e., absent discovery, the parties will have a similar result (on average)
at trial.178 Moreover, indirect flow of information, through litigation
173. E.g., Moore, supra note 2, at 1112 (“Plaintiff’s lawyers almost unanimously opposed
[the contraction of discovery under the 2015 Amendments], and defendant’s lawyers almost
unanimously favored [it].”).
174. Moore, supra note 2, at 1112. Notably, during the rulemaking process 171 law
professors, led by Janet Alexander, Judith Resnik and Stephen C. Yeazell, “urge[d] th[e]
Committee [on Rules of Practice and Procedure] to reject the proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that would limit the scope of discovery.” Letter of 171 Law
Professors Urging Rejection of Changing Federal Rules to Limit Discovery and Eliminate
Forms (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/frcp_171_law_
professors_urging_rejection_of_changing_federal_rules_2.18.14.pdf.
175. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. “[T]he
burden of responding to discovery lies heavier on the party who has more information.”
176. Rhee, supra note 5, at 547; see also supra notes 6, 42 and accompanying text.
177. As explained earlier, supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text, litigants can
sometimes transmit information directly, e.g., handing over favorable information; however,
for various reasons, such a direct informational flow is not always feasible.
178. Empirical studies on this issue are unfortunately rare. Cf. Kuo-Chang Huang, Does
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signals, is of course not akin to discovery. Litigation signals indicate
information, which facilitates settlements; they do not actually reveal
new information. Thus, discovery may well have other benefits, which
litigation signals lack.179 The general point, though, remains—absent
broad discovery parties still have both the incentives and the capacity to
indirectly transmit information.
Second, our account suggests that a broad right to discovery is not
as costly as it seems to be. While discovery proceedings may be
expensive in and of themselves, mindful parties can often avoid these
costs through pre-discovery signaling.
While our arguments are theoretical, some evidence corroborates
our position. To illustrate our last point consider the pre-2015 world, an
era of broad discovery. In this world, many cases settled at an early stage
without the need to conduct discovery.180 In fact, while in the last
decades of the twentieth century the right to discovery has become
broader,181 there was a parallel, sharp increase in the fraction of cases
that settled after filing and before discovery.182 This trend seems
counterintuitive—in light of broader discovery, why would the parties
settle before it? One can argue that this increase in (very) early
settlements is understandable as trials became more costly.183 When
costs of litigation rise, parties are less motivated to litigate.184
Nevertheless, given the innate informational gaps between defendants
and plaintiffs, and that discovery is relatively cheap for plaintiffs,185 we
could expect the uninformed plaintiff to restrain its desire to settle until
discovery provides more information. Our theory of litigation signals
complements the picture. Facing sizeable costs, parties preferred to settle
Discovery Promote Settlement? An Empirical Answer, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 241
(2009) (providing empirical evidence for the proposition that the introduction of discovery
proceedings in Taiwan increased the rate of settlements).
179. For instance, discovery enables third-parties to use the public information that the
process reveals.
180. “The largest number of settlements occur immediately after a complaint is filed, and
before any motion practice or discovery occurs.” Hubbard, supra note 84, at *2.
181. E.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 561–72 (2010).
182. E.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 482 (2004).
183. Broader discovery presumably increases the costs of litigation. See, e.g., supra notes
166, 181 and accompanying text.
184. E.g., supra note 95 and accompanying text.
185. As it is the informed party who typically bears the major costs of discovery. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see also Geoffrey P.
Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 181 (2010) (“[I]t is cheap for the
plaintiff to file a complaint but expensive for defendants to comply with discovery demands.”
(footnote omitted)).
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early, even before discovery; litigation signals enabled the informal flow
of information between the parties and facilitated the urge to early
settlements. In an era of broad discovery, then, experience suggests that
the vast majority of litigants found their way to settle before it. Discovery
was costly, but rarely was it realized. Indeed, per filed case, costs of
discovery seem to be smaller than expected.186
We enrich, then, the usual debate on discovery. In a world with no
discovery it is in the interest of the parties to inform each other in order
to avoid costly trials, and they have a variety of litigation maneuvers to
achieve this goal. In a world of broad and costly discovery, we will
expect the parties to signal information to avoid its expenses.
Importantly, our litigation signals framework explains how parties could
implicitly transmit information before discovery even when they cannot
directly do so, e.g., because they lack favorable evidence to hand over.187
Therefore, changes in the scope of formal discovery, including the 2015
Amendments, should have a limited effect on the actual position of
uninformed litigants and the costs to informed ones. We stress that our
argument pertains to formal discovery proceedings, as opposed to other
procedural mechanisms that indirectly limit the scope of discovery188
and the ability of plaintiffs to reach trial.189
B. Party Rulemaking
The litigation signals perspective emphasizes litigants’ ability to
convey information through a wide array of voluntary commitments.
Therefore, it directly pertains to the debate on the extent to which
litigants should be free to fashion their procedures—what Robert Bone
refers to as party rulemaking.190 The more freedom parties have the
easier it is for them to signal information. In this sense, the litigation
signals perspective adds another layer, in favor of customized procedure,
186. E.g., Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in
Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 779–81 (2010); Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice
Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2094–95 (2002).
187. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (in many cases parties would like to
transmit information, but lack the means to do so).
188. In particular, in the last decade the Court directed trial courts to dismiss—at the outset
of litigation and before discovery kicks in—cases that do not present a sufficient factual
threshold. E.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To the extent defendants can fend off uninformed plaintiffs relatively
costlessly at the outset, they need not use litigation signals to convey their merits.
189. For similar reasons, to the extent plaintiffs cannot reach a trial without discovery,
e.g., because otherwise they lose on summary judgment, a limited right to discovery could
induce defendants to withstand discovery proceedings rather than signal their true type before
discovery.
190. Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 89.
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to the general discussion on party rulemaking. In addition, the litigation
signals perspective can provide concrete policy recommendations
regarding several procedural dilemmas that courts struggle with.
1. Default or Mandatory Rules of Procedure?
Should rules of procedure be mandatory or default? Can parties, in
actuality, customize their own procedures? With regard to the first,
normative question, the literature has struggled to define the proper
scope of party rulemaking, laying out various for-and-against
considerations. The benefits of customized litigation are evident.
Contracts in which parties define their procedures break the one-sizefits-all nature of legal procedure. They thus enable parties to benefit from
procedures that better suit their taste,191 and can reduce the costs to the
court system.192 The capacity to agree on individualized procedures
enhances party autonomy and participation,193 plausibly, core values of
adversary systems. These benefits notwithstanding, party rulemaking
also raises serious difficulties. Delegating to the parties the power to
shape procedure is problematic when consent is not perceived as
meaningful and the bargaining capacities of the parties are far from being
equal.194 And even where there is actual consent, some procedural
agreements inflict costs on third parties and/or the legal system.195
Finally, parties’ choices can harm the legitimacy of the legal system.196
These general arguments form the core of the “sharply divided” 197
debate over party rulemaking, and they pertain, in varying extents, to
procedural choices that are made before and after a dispute arises.198

191. E.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723,
731 (2011) (describing the argument “that allowing parties to tailor the process to their
particular dispute can increase both certainty and efficiency.” (footnotes omitted)). To
illustrate, in technologically complex disputes parties can benefit from waiving the right to a
jury trial. Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 89, at 1356.
192. Procedural contracts reduce the costs of the parties, and to the extent private and
public costs are correlated they also reduce the costs to the legal system. See id.
193. See, e.g., id., at 1357–59 (critically examining these arguments).
194. See, e.g., id., at 1360–69. See also Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The
Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 516 (2007)
(“customization could strip litigation of procedures designed to protect the weakest . . . ”).
195. E.g., Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 89, at 1372–78. Thus, “litigants could not
mutually agree to a process that triples the number of days spent in trial.” Moffitt, supra note
194, at 508.
196. Certain procedures “like a coin flip . . . seem sharply at odds with what courts are
supposed to do . . . [and] should be categorically forbidden . . .” Bone, Party Rulemaking,
supra note 89, at 1384.
197. See Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 89, at 1333.
198. A separate issue, which we do not discuss, is whether the parties are more likely to
enter into procedural agreements before or after the dispute arises. Cf. id. at 1340 (“Some
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The literature on procedural contracts has generally failed to
identify another consideration—the link between customized procedures
and settlements.199 Default rules of procedure facilitate signaling.
Mandatory procedures do not. This distinction stems from the fact that
strong informed parties can indicate their strength by undertaking a
commitment to change a default rule—to agree to a one-way fee-shifting
provision, waive a statute of limitations defense, etc. A mandatory
requirement applies to all defendants, strong and weak alike, and it does
not allow the strong ones to convey their strength by undertaking
additional obligations.200 Therefore, greater procedural freedom expands
avenues to signal information, generating more settlements. The
litigation signals theory adds, then, a deeper understanding of the stakes
to the general for and against arguments.
This conclusion entails a host of policy implications as current
procedures do not fully endow the parties with the power to modify the
rules. On the face of it, the rules of procedure seem largely as default
rules.201 Indeed, we do believe that there are many situations in which
parties use procedural modifications to signal information, implicitly or
explicitly.202 However, things are more nuanced, and the capacity of
parties to stipulate over the rules is more limited than it first seems. First,
some notable procedures are mandatory. Subject matter jurisdiction is a
classic example—parties cannot agree, explicitly or implicitly, to litigate
in a court that lacks jurisdiction.203 There are other examples. Previously,
commentators assume that cooperation is nearly impossible during litigation, but they tend to
exaggerate the difference between ex ante and ex post”).
199. “[O]ther than a few hints here and there, th[e] connection [between procedure
modification agreements and settlements] has never been identified.” Prescott & Spier, supra
note 13, at 83 (footnote omitted).
200. To further illustrate this point, take the American rule, which holds that each party
bears its legal expenses. Under a regime which allows modifications to this rule, the strong
defendant may signal by committing to one-way fee-shifting. She could do so through
unilateral, third-party, or cooperative signaling, under the conditions we defined in Part III.A.
In a regime that does not allow stipulations to the American rule, the strong defendant does
not have the option to signal through committing to one-way fee-shifting. Under a regime that
mandates one-way fee-shifting, both weak and strong defendants are committed to pay their
rival should they lose, and the strong defendant again cannot distinguish herself from the weak
one.
201. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 169 (4th ed. 2004) (“One of the
hallmarks of U.S. law is the extent to which the rules of procedure are ‘default’ rules . . .”).
Several rules explicitly authorize the parties to modify the rules. E.g., Colter L. Paulson,
Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the Norms Underlying Civil Procedure,
45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 484 (2013) (noting rules that allow parties to stipulate the scope of
discovery and amend pleading, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f), 29, 15(a)).
202. See supra Part III.B.
203. E.g., Shay Lavie, Are Judges Tied to the Past? Evidence from Jurisdiction Cases, 43
HOFSTRA L. REV. 337, 343–46 (2014).
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we noted the signaling power of one-way fee-shifting stipulations.204
Nonetheless, several states—most notably California—specifically
forbid these agreements.205
But even beyond these specific enclaves of mandatory provisions
parties do not seem to exercise considerable freedom in shaping their
disputes. Perhaps surprisingly, it seems that “most lawyers and potential
litigants do not think of the rules of litigation as default rules,”206 and in
practice opportunities for customized litigation appear to be largely
unfulfilled.207 We suspect that lack of innovation in the legal market is
one important explanation.208 But another plausible part of the story is
the restrictive attitude of policymakers and courts. Even if procedural
customization is not explicitly forbidden, courts that are reluctant to
enforce procedural understandings deter litigants from entering into such
agreements. “[W]ithout formal assurance of legal enforcement, parties
would have trouble making credible commitments.”209 Indeed, courts
seemingly hesitate to enforce various agreements, such as stipulations
regarding the scope and timing of discovery, agreements on the
admissibility of evidence, and commitments not to file amended
pleadings.210
Particularly, we observe difficulties in enforcing stipulations that
we identify as potential signals. Courts often “find ways to avoid” feeshifting stipulations, such that it is “difficult for parties to depend on the
enforcement” of such provisions.211 Some courts reject contractual
understandings to forego a statute of limitations defense,212 and limit
agreements that modify the award at trial.213 Mary Carter agreements,
which can be used by co-defendants to signal information,214 are
204. See supra Part II.B.1.
205. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a). Other states with similar restrictions include Oregon,
Washington, and New York. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 58, at 329 n.6, 342.
206. Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules
of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 612 (2007).
207. See infra notes 275275–282 and accompanying text.
208. We briefly discuss this issue below. See infra notes 268–274 and accompanying text.
209. Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 89, at 1351 (discussing the lack of case law in
the field and the capacity of judges to refuse to enforce procedural agreements).
210. Moffitt, supra note 194, at 471, 473, 468.
211. Paulson, supra note 201, at 507, 510. For a survey of the doctrine see id., at 506–11.
212. Id. at 500.
213. Id. at 501.
214. As discussed above, supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text, in Mary Carter
agreements one co-defendant essentially agrees to pay the plaintiff conditional on the outcome
of the other trials. Technically, one co-defendant settles and in exchange the plaintiff commits
to credit to the settling defendant any amount the plaintiff later recovers against non-settling
defendants. Mary Carter agreements can thus signal the strength of the settling co-defendant,
relative to the remaining defendants. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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prohibited in several jurisdictions.215 Finally, there are reasons to believe
that courts will hesitate to enforce explicit monetary commitments that
are conditional on the judgment, especially those that specify a nontrivial augmentation of the award. A fee-shifting agreement “that
explicitly calls for unreasonable fees will be struck down as punitive”;216
and in contract law liquidated damages, an analogous monetary
commitment, are disfavored when they are “deemed to constitute a
penalty.”217
The general upshot is clear: Litigation signals provide another
justification for party rulemaking, where courts and policymakers do not
seem to fully facilitate it. The restrictions on parties’ freedom to fashion
their procedures definitely have independent policy reasons. Subject
matter jurisdiction is an external limit on the power of courts.218
Restrictions on one-way fee-shifting agreements seem to be motivated
by the desire to prevent powerful parties from drafting disadvantageous
provisions.219 Mary Carter provisions also raise concerns.220 More
broadly, there are many reasons to hesitate to enforce procedural
contracts.221 We are not seeking to doubt the wisdom of policies that
moderate the scope of party rulemaking. Rather, our goal is to stress that
these restrictions narrow the array of signaling options available to
informed parties. In sum, parties do seem to signal information through
procedural modifications, but the opportunities to do so are not fully
available in the current legal climate.
2. Lessons from the Litigation Signals Perspective
In addition to the general argument in favor of procedural freedom,
the litigation signals perspective can contribute to the understanding of
specific procedural dilemmas.
a. Self-penalizing Commitments
Effective signaling requires the “good” defendants to commit to a
penalty, in order to distinguish themselves from weak ones. The greater
215. Bernstein & Klerman, supra note 74, at 2216–18.
216. Paulson, supra note 201, at 510.
217. Id. at 504 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[L]iquidated damages are disfavored
. . . even when the transaction was voluntary and the parties have equal bargaining.” Id.; see
also infra Part IV.B.2.a,d (discussion aversion to self-penalizing commitments; showing that
monetary commitments conditional on the judgment can be vulnerable to anti-gambling
provisions).
218. Lavie, supra note 203, at 343–46.
219. E.g., Krent, supra note 62, at 2043 n.25.
220. Bernstein & Klerman, supra note 74, at 2216–18.
221. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.
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the penalty, the more effective the signal is—and thus we should expect
parties to undertake onerous commitments. However, it seems that
courts loath such penalizing commitments. For example, seemingly
“punitive” fee-shifting and liquidated damages agreements are regularly
not enforced.222 Likewise, courts limit the enforcement of voluntary,
meaningful penalties for discovery abuse.223
We can speculate as to the reasons for this strong aversion to
voluntarily commit to penalties. Courts appear to treat these agreements
as unfair as the penalty seems excessive at the time in which it is realized;
but judges give little weight to the incentives of parties to enter into these
agreements at the outset.224 Relatedly, courts often prefer not to constrain
their decision-making, and they favor a merits decision over a procedural
penalty.225
The aversion to self-penalizing commitments presumably has
policy reasons. Our goal is to highlight the other side of the ledger:
restrictive judicial policy undermines effective signaling—through
monetary and procedural concessions alike. Against the interest in expost fairness, there exists a social interest in respecting the ex-ante
commitments of the parties; against the interest in a merits decision one
should consider the savings in trial expenses.
b. Credible Commitments, Reneging, and Rigid Procedures
A related point is the capacity of parties to renege on their
stipulations. At the core of effective signals lies the “good” party’s
promise to undertake an obligation that the “bad” defendant is unwilling
to offer. If the plaintiff knows that defendants can later change their mind
the signal loses its informative value. To fully tap the benefits of
contractual freedom, then, courts should not allow parties to renege on
their contractual stipulations. Rigid rules and deadlines preclude the
possibility of late changes of mind and ensure that parties can commit to
irreversible choices.226
222. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
223. E.g., TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex. 1991)
(“Sanctions which are so severe as to preclude presentation of the merits of the case should
not be assessed absent a party’s flagrant bad faith or counsel’s callous disregard for the
responsibilities of discovery under the rules.”).
224. See Paulson, supra note 201, at 525 (“courts usually determined the reasonableness
of the procedure by reference to the fairness of its effect in the lawsuit, rather than the ex ante
fairness of the contractual bargain.”).
225. Id. at 523, 524 (“Clauses that limit the relief that a judge may impose are greatly
disfavored” and courts “usually bend over backward to decide cases on the merits.”). See also
supra note 214.
226. Cf. Rhee, supra note 5, at 540 (discussing the capacity of parties to offer a “bond of
good faith [by] the assumption of a higher standard of proof” and maintaining that the “bond
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To illustrate consider the following. A strong defendant plans to
signal her strength by waiving a preliminary, statute-of-limitations
defense. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure hold that this defense
must be raised by the defendant at an early stage—within her answer to
the plaintiff’s complaint.227 Accordingly, an answer that fails to raise a
statute of limitations defense should indicate to the plaintiff that the
defendant implicitly waived the defense. However, this strict rule is
subject to the generally permissive approach that the Rules embrace.
Rule 15(a), which governs the issue of amendments to pleadings, allows
defendants to raise arguments tardily, notwithstanding the rival’s
opposition, “when justice so requires.”228 This liberal approach neuters
the informative value of implicit waivers of this type.
In response, more sophisticated parties can explicitly commit not to
raise certain claims. However, such contracts can be more complicated
to draft. More importantly, it seems that even explicit commitments will
not be respected—as courts will again tend to allow parties, at least in
certain cases, permission to amend pleadings. Accordingly, scholars
lamented that “[t]he current rules provide no reliable mechanism for
parties to assure themselves early on that the scope of litigation has been
(and will remain) contained.”229 This permissive approach prevents
litigants from committing to “lash themselves to the mast”230 and
frustrates signaling. Indeed, while litigants are presumably interested in
committing not to raise new claims,231 it is hard to find cases in which
parties explicitly contracted to waive their right to amend.232
Rule 15 and the liberal approach to tardy amendments reflect a
more general tendency to allow aggrieved litigants to deviate from
procedural agreements.233 This approach has merits, as it assigns greater
is useless if it can be canceled [later]”).
227. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
228. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
229. Moffitt, supra note 194, at 468; see also 83 C.J.S. Stipulations § 60 (2016) (“A
stipulation not to amend a pleading . . . does not prevent the court from granting an amendment
at the trial in the furtherance of justice.”); Paulson, supra note 201, at 524 (“courts regularly
allow parties to avoid stipulations they make at pretrial conferences based on changed
circumstances and fairness.”).
230. Moffitt, supra note 194, at 471. The famous analogy is the mythical Odysseus, who
tied himself to the mast in order to avoid being lured by the seductive call of the sirens. Id.
231. E.g. id. at 468 (interviewing a litigator).
232. We looked through Westlaw for stipulations not to amend and found no such cases
(we tried several search commands including for example: (agree! stipulat!) /s “not to amend”)
/p (pleading! answer)). Of course, it may be that there are procedural agreements not to
amend—perhaps our search did not find them, and/or courts are not faced with the need to
decide these stipulations. However, the absence of case law at the least suggests that such
agreements are not prevalent.
233. See Moffitt, supra note 194, at 471 (discussing another notable example, “grant[ing]
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weight to fairness at the expense of strict, technical pleading.234
However, it is destructive to litigation signals. Our perspective, then,
highlights the overlooked, subtle benefits that strict procedures entail.
The analysis in this Article therefore suggests a more nuanced
application of Rule 15(a). Currently, courts have interpreted it broadly,
refusing to grant leave to amend only in extreme circumstances.235 In
particular, the current inquiry focuses on the plaintiff-defendant pair,
asking whether the party who wishes to amend harms the opposing
party.236 The litigation signals perspective, in contrast, looks at the
different groups of informed parties. Late amendments enable an
informed negligent doctor to mask the weakness of her case and blend a
truthful message that a careful doctor could have sent. The possibility of
late amendments, then, creates uncertainty and prevents plaintiffs from
settling with those who chose to genuinely waive important defenses.
Particularly, courts should be suspicious of tardy assertions when there
are asymmetries of information in the background. Likewise, reneging
on implicit waivers, which serve as unilateral signals,237 is particularly
suspicious where the costs are high relative to the stakes.238
By the same logic, our Article provides an argument in favor of
maintaining rigid deadlines. To illustrate, consider the rule that allows
defendants thirty days to remove a case from a state to a federal forum.239
To the extent that this deadline is strictly enforced, the plaintiff can
presume on the thirty-first day that the defendant waived its right to
litigate in a federal court. To the extent this waiver signals information,
a settlement can be agreed upon immediately after the deadline passed.
Courts that interpret the thirty-days limit flexibly, to allow removals later
on, delay the realization of signaling-induced settlements.240
a motion by one litigant to permit discovery beyond that which was mutually negotiated.”).
234. E.g., RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 245
(6th ed. 2013); see also supra note 216 and accompanying text.
235. E.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“In the absence of any apparent or
declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive . . . —the leave sought
should, as the rules require, be `freely given.'). See also 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1479 (3d ed. 2010).
236. Courts ask whether the opposing party “was taken by unfair surprise and prejudiced
by the delayed assertion.” S. Wallace Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 353 F.3d
367, 373–74 (4th Cir. 2003). Another factor is “the bad faith of the moving party.” O’Connell
v. Hyatt Hotels of Puerto Rico, 357 F.3d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 2004); see generally Foman. 371
U.S. 178 at 182.
237. If the signal were cooperative the parties would presumably agree, through an
explicit stipulation, to disregard the claim.
238. Recall that a pre-requisite to unilateral signals is that litigation expenses are at least
half of the expected judgment. See supra Part III.A.2.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
240. Cf. Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2013) (deciding
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c. Bargaining Chips
Sometimes parties use “bargaining chips,” i.e., valid claims or
defenses that are raised and then dropped with the intention to settle.
Bargaining chips are a potential signaling tool. However, courts can be
hostile to such litigation maneuvers.
The following actual example, Adams v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, is illustrative.241 The plaintiffs in Adams brought a
class action against their insurer in a state court. The insurer removed the
case to a federal court, a more favorable forum for defendants.242 The
case was then stayed in order to allow the parties to reach a settlement.243
After protracted settlement negotiations the insurer agreed to dismiss the
federal proceedings244—or, in the foregoing terminology, it dropped its
right to litigate in a more favorable forum. Concurrently, the parties went
back to the state court and settled.245 This description fits a litigation
signal that is based on dropping a procedural right—resulting in an early
settlement that saved the need to conduct costly discovery and trial.246
Of course, there may well be alternative readings. As is typical in
class litigation, once the parties reach a settlement they presumably
prefer a more lenient forum—a state court, in that case.247 However, the
parties could have avoided strict scrutiny of future settlements by staying
in a state court. The fact that a defendant removes a case to a federal
forum—and then agrees to return to a state court—is at least somewhat

in favor of a flexible rule regarding the 30-day deadline while recognizing that “defendants
may sometimes be able to delay filing a notice of removal until it is strategically advantageous
to do so.” Id. at 1126).
241. Adams v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, No. 2:14-cv-02013, slip op. at 2 (W.D.
Ark. April 14, 2016) [hereinafter Adams, April 2016 Order]. For a discussion of this case see
Jacqueline Matthews, Sanctions Imposed on Five Attorneys for Class Settlement Forum
Shopping,
CLASS
ACTION
LAWSUIT
DEFENSE
(Aug.
15,
2016),
http://www.classactionlawsuitdefense.com/2016/08/15/sanctions-imposed-on-fiveattorneys-for-class-settlement-forum-shopping/.
242. The defendant removed the case to a federal court following the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). Adams, April 2016 Order, supra note 232, at *2. CAFA’s
removal rules were enacted to enable defendants in certain class actions to avoid state courts,
which “were viewed as less friendly to defendants than federal courts.” ROBERT H. KLONOFF,
CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 248 (4th ed. 2012).
243. Adams, April 2016 Order, supra note 232.
244. Id. at *2–4.
245. Adams v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, No. 2:14-cv-02013 (W.D. Ark. Dec.
21, 2015) [hereinafter Adams, Dec. 2015 Order].
246. The circumstances suggest that this is a cooperative signal—the dismissal from the
federal docket was negotiated as part of the mediation process that gave birth to the
substantive settlement. Adams, April 2016 Order, supra note 232, at 1–2.
247. Id. at 6 (“Arkansas courts [where the case was originally filed] do not undertake a
rigorous analysis of whether the class certification requirements are met”).
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puzzling.248 The litigation signals approach can explain why defendants
create a temporary litigation advantage and drop it later, without an
apparent change in the surrounding circumstances.249 Importantly, it
seems that dropping federal jurisdiction was essential to reaching a
settlement.250
The federal court in Adams, though, denounced this tactic as an
“abuse of process in using [the federal court] as a bargaining chip,” an
“inappropriate procedural gamesmanship with no intent to actually
litigate claims in good faith.”251 The federal judge’s dissatisfaction is
understandable. Apparently, the defendant did use the federal court’s
jurisdiction “as a bargaining chip.” However, from the litigation signals
perspective this strategy is useful for the defendant to convey
information to the plaintiff and achieve an early settlement. While the
federal judge may have had other, good reasons to condemn the behavior
of the attorneys,252 this story demonstrates how the litigation signals
approach can shed a different light on various litigation maneuvers.
d. Anti-gambling Provisions
Finally, we note that similar notions of “gamesmanship” can
hamper litigation signals in other ways. In particular, multipliers on the
judgment (Hypotheticals III-V) are wagers, as the informed party
“doubles down.”253 As a result, the use of explicit monetary
commitments as litigation signals seems to be vulnerable to antigambling provisions.254
Several courts have found that third-party investment in litigation,

248. For a similar practice in other cases see id. at 28–29.
249. The reader may wonder whether a similar signal could have been accomplished by a
statement of the defendant in which it commits to never remove the case to a federal court.
We suspect, though, that such a statement would not constitute a credible commitment as
courts would allow the defendant to renege and remove the case later on. See the discussion
on reneging and credible commitments, supra Part IV.B.2.b.
250. The parties “engaged in protracted settlement negotiations” for more than a year.
Adams v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, No. 2:14-cv-02013 (W.D. Ark. August 3, 2016)
[hereinafter: Adams, August 2016 Order].
251. Adams, Dec. 2015 Order, supra note 236, at 5, 6.
252. We acknowledge that the act of removing to a federal forum and dismissing thereafter
wastes the federal court’s resources—and it may therefore be wise to sanction the attorneys.
The judge indeed found that some of the attorneys violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Adams, August 2016 Order, supra note 241. However, as the case required
little judicial attention while it was pending, it is plausible to think that the costs the parties
inflicted on the federal judiciary were not considerably large.
253. Cf. Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 78 (predicting situations in which “litigants
will prefer to increase their bets, literally hoping to double down.”).
254. Cf. Donohue, supra note 61, at 1111 (discussing a similar argument with regard to
stipulations to use a loser-pays rule).
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in exchange for a sum contingent on the outcome, constitutes unlawful
gambling—“a bet by which two parties agree that a certain sum . . .
should be paid . . . on the happening . . . of an uncertain event.”255 In
addition, several states explicitly criminalize “bet[ting] on result of
trial.”256 This logic renders multiplier provisions unlawful.257 These legal
concerns may be the reason why explicit monetary commitments, as
opposed to other signaling techniques such as waiving defenses, are
uncommon.258
Like other litigation maneuvers, the litigation signals approach
sheds a different light on such “bets.” A deeper understanding of the
utility of these tactics can thus dissipate legal concerns over judgmentcontingent commitments.
C. Court Procedures
The previous discussion showed that some signaling mechanisms
are frowned upon by courts, and that litigants do not fully achieve the
benefits of private contracting. This state of affairs indicates that there is
a considerable room for utilizing court-procedures to facilitate
bargaining—and signaling—between the parties.259 In particular, the use
of court-procedures can streamline third-party signals.
Third-party litigation signals are promises to spend a certain sum,
in addition to the judgment, conditional on losing the case.260 Our
analysis suggests that third-party signals may be the easiest to
implement. Unlike cooperative signals, third-party signals require little

255. Wilson v. Harris, 688 So. 2d 265 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From
Champerty to Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 457–58 (2011) (exploring the argument
that third-party investment in litigation constitutes illegal gambling).
256. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.14 (2016). A similar provision exists in California, CAL.
PENAL CODE § 337a (2016).
257. Interestingly, baseball arbitration, which shares some similarities to litigation signals,
supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text, “has been criticized for encouraging
gamesmanship” and “as a form of legalized gambling.” Respectively, Elissa M. Meth, Note
& Comment, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic and
International Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 383, 410 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Borris, supra note 131, at 315. Bottom-line negotiating, the mediation technique in
which parties are asked to commit to pay a sum conditional on the final award, was also
described as gambling. Young, supra note 133, at 21.
258. A related legal obstacle is the requirement of consideration. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). This rule casts doubt on the ability to enforce
unilateral, judgment-contingent signals. We thank Daniel Hemel for suggesting this point.
259. There is surprisingly little academic and practical interest in this issue. One exception
is Gertner & Miller, supra note 27, who envision a process in which the court secretly receives
offers from both sides to encourage parties to make truthful demands.
260. See our discussion in supra Part III.A.3.
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cooperation between the parties.261 Unlike unilateral signals, third party
signals are more likely to be triggered by informed litigants as they entail
no direct gain to the rival party.262 However, third-party signals require
the uninformed plaintiff to believe that the defendant’s promise to spend
the money, upon losing the case, is credible.263 Mere promises to pay
third parties or spend money can be meaningless, from the plaintiff’s
perspective. Obligations that are more trustworthy presumably
necessitate more elaborate and costly devices. A simple and effective
solution is using the court—by allowing the defendant to deposit the
additional sum with the court clerk, to be paid into the court funds should
the defendant lose the case.
Rigid obligations, as opposed to mere promises, allow the
uninformed litigant to better trust the message that its informed rival
sends. While we are unware of court procedures that enable litigants to
commit to pay an additional sum, contingent on a judgment against them,
this simple mechanism can facilitate the flow of information between the
parties.264
CONCLUDING REMARKS—A CALL FOR LITIGATION SIGNALS
This Article illustrates how litigants can transmit information
credibly in asymmetric information situations through a variety of
litigation maneuvers—“litigation signals.” Some of these techniques are
less common, for example monetary commitments to pay upon losing.
Others, such as fee-shifting provisions, waiving claims and defenses, and
award-modification agreements, are more frequent.
The capacity of litigants to convey information credibly by various
means has a variety of implications. In general, litigation signals are
beneficial as they facilitate the flow of information between the parties
and encourage settlements.265 In particular, the use of litigation signals
261. See the comparison of the different litigation signals, in the Table that follows supra
note 121.
262. Sее supra Part III.A.3.
263. Cf. supra Part IV.B.2.b (identifying a similar problem in the context of commitments
to waive claims and defenses). Relatedly, donations to third-parties could indirectly benefit
the defendant, again diluting the informative power of the signal.
264. Cf. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (distinguishing, for Rule
68 purposes, between mere promises to pay and “actually deposit[ing] the full amount
demanded.” Id. at 671); Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2016)
(distinguishing, for Rule 68 purposes, between depositing the settlement amount in an escrow
account and “deposit[ing] [the] money in court,” which “could be treated as the equivalent of
an actual payment.” Id. at 1145 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
265. Litigation signals can have various ex-ante effects. On the one hand, signaling saves
costly trials and hence dilutes the incentive of informed defendants to take care. On the other
hand, signaling improves the position of careful defendants, the “good” types, relative to
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can substitute for formal discovery, the goal of which is to compel
information-sharing. Litigation signals also justify conferring freedom
on parties to shape their procedures. Moreover, litigation signals stress
the desirability of court procedures designed to facilitate negotiation.
In addition to highlighting the legal means through which litigation
signals may be executed and their potential implications, this Article
seeks a better understanding of the mechanics of such signals. Litigation
signals can be based on obligations to the plaintiff or a third party and
they can require different levels of cooperation between the parties.
Accordingly, we classified litigation signals into three groups—the
simpler unilateral signals; third-party signals; and the more complicated
cooperative signals, in which both parties are directly involved. While
simple forms of signals may not be useful, more effective tools require
greater sophistication.
We expect parties in asymmetric information situations to signal
information, at least to some extent. We provide empirical evidence that
corroborates the assertion that litigants signal through simple, nonmonetary means such as procedural concessions. However, beyond
limited examples in the context of arbitration and mediation, we do not
observe the most straightforward litigation signals—i.e., monetary
commitments to pay an additional sum, conditioned on losing the case.
There may be several reasons why litigation signals in general, and
monetary commitments in particular, are not used more widely.
Transaction costs and a discouraging legal environment can frustrate the
inclination to use signals. Monetary commitments are particularly
vulnerable. They can be inhibited by anti-gambling norms,266 and
restrictive ethics rules that make it harder for lawyers to commit to
monetary rewards.267
Notwithstanding these restrictions, we conjecture that a major issue
is the lack of innovation in the legal market.268 In this sense, our Article
serves as a call for greater use of innovative settlement provisions.269 It
negligent ones. Analyzing these effects is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Ivan P. L. P’ng,
Litigation, Liability and Incentives for Care, 34 J. PUB. ECON. 61 (1987) (analyzing the exante implications of loser-pays rules along these lines); Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at
138–41 (briefly discussing the broader, ambiguous welfare implications of partial settlements
and high-low agreements).
266. See supra Part IV.B.2.d.
267. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. Another possible concern is that, if
settlement negotiations fail, the monetary commitment could be revealed, affecting the
decision-maker. Cf. Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 131 n.296 (discussing a similar issue
in the context of award-modification agreements).
268. This point was also raised in interviews that we conducted with practicing attorneys.
269. We thus join Prescott and Spier, supra note 13, who maintain that “One would hope
that litigants (or their attorneys) would be exploring innovative forms of partial settlement as
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is not a novel proposition that the legal market suffers from agency
problems270 and inefficiencies,271 resulting in a dearth of innovation.272
In general, “the homogeneous nature of the legal profession” mutes and
limits “[i]nnovations in dispute resolution.”273 Existing practices are
entrenched, and new, innovative practices often require exogenous
“shocks,” such as “changes in legal interpretations of terms, or
technological advances.”274 In the absence of such shocks existing
practices prevail.
A striking example may be seen in the gap between the theory on
customized procedures and current practices. Numerous commentators
have pointed to the benefits of customized litigation.275 Nonetheless,
litigants and their lawyers do not seem to fully tap the benefits of tailormade procedures. Several scholars who have explored procedural
customization in depth conclude that it is far from being prevalent.
Michael Moffitt asserts that, with respect to post-dispute agreements,
“most customization within the rules is relatively modest.”276 Similarly,
others conclude that post-dispute “agreements are necessarily rare or
almost trivial.”277 David Hoffman, who examines empirically predispute contracts, describes a similar view. Other than specific
modifications, “parties almost never use contract terms to vary their

a matter of course, given the gains these arrangements can offer.” Id. at 79–80 (footnote
omitted).
270. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707 (1998).
271. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 58, at 375 (asserting that “no obvious
market process exists that would drive out less efficient clauses”).
272. In one influential empirical study, for example, John Coates concluded that one
should “blame the lawyers” for sub-optimal takeover defense provisions. John C. Coates IV,
Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301
(2001). This does not mean that there are no legal innovations. Martin Lipton, for instance,
has famously devised the takeover defense known as “poison pill.” Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers
in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW.
1435 (2005). It seems, though, that such innovations are fairly uncommon.
273. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 993–94 (2000). The legal profession is homogenous
because it “defines and reproduces itself.” Id. at 993.
274. Hoffman, supra note 149, at 426 (internal quotation marks omitted).
275. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of party
rulemaking); Hoffman, supra note 149, at 391–93 (surveying relevant literature).
276. Moffitt, supra note 194, at 495.
277. Prescott & Spier, supra note 13, at 85 (describing “the general assumption” among
“contract-procedure authors.”). See also Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 89, at 1342 (“I
found very few examples of agreements entered into after filing, other than the usual
stipulations for additional time and the like.”); Donohue, supra note 61 (predicting that parties
should stipulate over the default fee-shifting rule, but finding no such post-dispute
stipulations. Id. at 1110 & n.38).
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post-dispute procedural contests.”278 Robert Bone concludes that
although “[p]arties can benefit from modifying procedural rules in a
variety of different ways both before and after a lawsuit is filed,” his
survey of cases yields “only a limited range of party rulemaking.”279
Notwithstanding the theoretical predictions, then, “the procedural dog
. . . has not barked.”280 While a restrictive judicial attitude toward
customized procedures can partly explain this reality,281 there seems to
be a clear link between the inefficiencies of the legal market and the lack
of valuable party rulemaking.282
These lessons pertain to litigation signals. If litigants do not
regularly customize litigation, “even in circumstances where we would
expect them to,”283 then we should not be surprised if they do not employ
the more sophisticated forms of litigation signals to their full extent.
In summary, while we show that litigation signals can be useful, in
practice their precise scope is not clear and future investigation would
be able to better specify their actual role. While litigants do seem to
employ primitive forms of signaling, the use of more developed forms is
currently circumscribed. Given the inefficiencies in the legal market in
general, and the lack of innovation concerning procedural contracts in
particular, it is not surprising that parties do not fully realize the benefits
of litigation signals. At minimum, we hope that our Article will provoke
further thought about these issues, among academics and practitioners
alike.

278. Hoffman, supra note 149, at 394. Notable exceptions, in which there exists “some
use” of contractual modifications of procedure include forum selection, choice of law,
attorney’s fees, and jury trial waivers. Id. at 424.
279. Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 89, at 1351.
280. Hoffman, supra note 149, at 394.
281. See supra notes 201–08 and accompanying text.
282. For a detailed discussion along these lines see Hoffman, supra note 149.
283. Hoffman, supra note 149, at 394.

